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Abstract
We employ a novel approach for analyzing the effects of relative consumption and relative
wealth preferences on both the decentralized and the socially optimal economic growth rates.
In the pertinent literature these effects are usually assessed by examining the dependence
of the growth rates on the two parameters of the instantaneous utility function that seem
to measure the strength of the relative consumption and the relative wealth motive. We
go beyond the sole consideration of parameters by revealing the fundamental factors that
ultimately determine long-run growth. In doing so we identify widely used types of status
preferences in which the traditional approach is prone to erroneous conclusions. For example,
in one of these specifications the parameter that seems to determine the strength of the
relative consumption motive actually also affects the strength of the relative wealth motive
and the elasticity of intertemporal substitution.
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1 Introduction
We propose a novel approach to reexamine the implications of both relative consumption and
relative wealth preferences.1 The analysis is carried out in the context of an otherwise standard
AK-model of endogenous growth with homogeneous agents and exogenous labor supply. In the
pertinent literature it is common practice to analyze the implications of such preferences in the
following way: First, a functional form of the instantaneous utility function is chosen that has
two crucial properties: i) it allows for the existence of a balanced growth path (BGP), and ii)
for mathematical convenience it contains as few parameters as possible. Second, the effects of
relative consumption and relative wealth preferences are assessed by analyzing the dependence
of the BGP growth rate on the two parameters of the instantaneous utility function that seem
to be the appropriate measures of the strength of the relative consumption and the relative
wealth motive. The aim of this paper is to show that this standard method of analysis involves
a great risk of drawing erroneous conclusions.
In order to give both mathematical and economic explanations for the potential fallacies
we go beyond the consideration of parameters by putting special emphasis on the identification
of the fundamental factors that ultimately determine both the decentralized and the socially
optimal long-run growth rates. These fundamental factors are connected to technology and
preferences. In our analysis we focus on the three fundamental factors that are linked to
the specification of the instantaneous utility function because they are appropriate measures
of the household’s willingness to substitute i) relative consumption for absolute consumption,
ii) relative wealth for absolute consumption, and iii) future absolute consumption for current
absolute consumption.
In our approach it becomes possible to analyze the effects of ceteris paribus changes in i)
the strength of the relative consumption motive, ii) the strength of the relative wealth motive,
and iii) the magnitude of the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution by considering a
change in the corresponding fundamental factor holding all else equal. In the standard approach,
however, such thought experiments cannot be carried out if specifications of utility functions are
used in which the crucial parameters affect more than one out of these three fundamental factors.
In such instances the standard approach is prone to erroneous conclusions. For example, in a
standard specification that we analyze in detail below, a certain parameter seems to affect only
the strength of the relative consumption motive. Our fundamental factor approach, however,
shows that this parameter also influences both the strength of the relative wealth motive and
the willingness to substitute absolute consumption intertemporally. The standard approach is
unaware of the latter two effects due to its ignorance of the fundamental factors. Hence, it
does not see any necessity to decompose the total reaction of the growth rate that results from
1In the literature, it is common practice to focus either on relative consumption or on relative wealth. For
specifications that employ relative consumption (or more general consumption externalities) see, for instance,
Abel (1990, 2005), Gal´ı (1994), Harbaugh (1996), Carroll et al. (1997), Rauscher (1997), Grossmann (1998),
Fisher and Hof (2000), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Liu and Turnovsky (2005), Turnovsky and Monteiro (2007),
Fisher and Heijdra (2009), Barnett et al. (2010), and Strulik (2015). Examples of the relative wealth approach
are Corneo and Jeanne (1997, 2001a,b), Futagami and Shibata (1998), Fisher and Hof (2005, 2008), Van Long
and Shimomura (2004), Garc´ıa-Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky (2008), and Fisher (2010). For frameworks that allow
for both specifications see Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2008), Riegler (2009), Ghosh and Wendner (2014), Ghosh
and Wendner (2018), Wendner (2015), and Klarl (2017).
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a change in the parameter into the three effects that correspond to the changes in the three
fundamental factors. Instead, it attributes the total growth effect erroneously to the change in
the strength of the relative consumption motive. It is thus possible that the resulting assertions
of the standard approach with respect to the implications of relative consumption preferences
on long-run growth are not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively flawed.
With our approach, we reexamine specifications of the instantaneous utility function that are
used in the pertinent literature. Three of them deal with the pure relative consumption approach
that abstracts from the relative wealth motive, whereas the three other specifications consider
the general case in which both relative consumption and relative wealth matter for utility. In
the context of the pure relative consumption approach we provide two prominent specifications
of preferences in which the standard approach leads to erroneous conclusions. Their common
feature is that the instantaneous utility function is obtained by applying an isoelastic (CRRA-
type) transformation to a geometric weighted average of absolute consumption and relative
consumption. The standard approach employs the derivative of the BGP growth rate with
respect to the weight of relative consumption to assess the implications of relative consumption
preferences. In so doing it fails to notice that a rise in the weight of relative consumption is
inevitably associated with a decrease in the weight of absolute consumption which, in turn,
changes the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution provided that the parameter of
the CRRA-type transformation is unequal to unity. In other words, the standard approach is
unaware of the fact that, in general, changes in the weight of relative consumption also lead to
changes in the willingness to substitute absolute consumption intertemporally and, hence, must
not be interpreted as ceteris paribus changes in the strength of the relative consumption motive.
In our third illustration of the pure relative consumption case the standard approach yields
correct results because the corresponding utility function exhibits no functional dependence
between its parameters.
The analysis becomes more complicated if the concept of the geometric weighted average
is applied to situations in which also relative wealth matters. Due to the fact that the sum
of the three weights equals unity by definition, a change in the weight of relative consumption
affects not only the strength of the relative consumption motive, but also the effective elasticity
of intertemporal substitution and/or the strength of the relative wealth motive. We illustrate
the resulting problems by means of two standard specifications. However, we also analyze a
seminal case in which the standard approach yields correct results and explain why this is the
case.
The problems of the standard approach that result from the presence of a functional depen-
dence between the parameters of the instantaneous utility function apply also to the analysis
of the socially optimal growth rate. Flawed conclusions might be drawn if parameters exist
that at first glance seem to determine only the strength of the relative consumption or the rel-
ative wealth motive, but actually also affect the willingness to substitute absolute consumption
intertemporally. More precisely, our fundamental factor approach shows that the socially opti-
mal growth rate is independent of both relative consumption and relative wealth preferences.
This, in turn, implies that any effect of such preferences on the socially optimal growth rate
that is detected by the standard analysis results exclusively from the unintended and unnoticed
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effect of parameter changes in the instantaneous utility function on the effective elasticity of
intertemporal substitution.
In providing appropriate economic interpretations of the effects of relative wealth and relative
consumption preferences and explaining the pitfalls of the standard analysis we draw heavily on
the Euler equation that governs the dynamic evolution of aggregate consumption in a symmetric
macroeconomic equilibrium. This Euler equation differs from its counterpart in the standard
model in the following respects: 1) If relative wealth matters for utility, then the market rate
of return is replaced by the effective rate of return. The latter is defined as the sum of the
market rate and an extra return that results from social comparisons that are based on both
relative wealth and relative consumption. More precisely, the comparison-induced extra return
is the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of absolute wealth for absolute consumption. A
very helpful technical trick of the paper is to express the comparison-induced extra return as
the product of the consumption-wealth ratio and the comparison-induced extra return factor
that has the following properties: i) It depends positively on the strength of the relative wealth
motive, irrespective of the strength of the relative consumption motive. This property ensures
that the willingness to save always depends positively on the strength of the relative wealth
motive. ii) If relative wealth matters for utility, then it depends negatively on the strength
of the relative consumption motive. The implied decrease in the willingness to save results
from the fact that any decrease in absolute consumption is associated with a reduction in
relative consumption that leads to an additional reduction in instantaneous utility. iii) In the
absence of the relative wealth motive it is identical to zero so that the comparison-induced extra
return vanishes irrespective of the strength of the relative consumption motive. Consequently,
the effective rate of return equals the market rate. 2) In principle, the effective elasticity of
intertemporal substitution may depend on the strength of the relative consumption motive.
This possibility vanishes, however, when we introduce weak restrictions on the utility function
that are sufficient for the existence of a balanced growth path (BGP).
The properties given in 1) and 2) imply that relative consumption and relative wealth
preferences influence the BGP growth rate directly only via their effect on the comparison-
induced extra return but not via the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution. There is
no indirect effect via the market rate of return that equals the marginal product of capital as
perceived by the representative firm. This is due to the fact that we restrict our attention to
the case in which labor supply is exogenously given.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the assumptions of the model and
study the optimal behavior of households and firms. In Section 3 we consider the macroeconomic
equilibrium of the decentralized economy. We derive conditions for the existence of a BGP and
analyze the long-run effects of relative consumption and relative wealth preferences by means
of the corresponding fundamental factors. In Section 4 we discuss widely-used specifications of
the instantaneous utility function in which the ignorance of the fundamental factors most likely
leads to erroneous conclusions. In Section 5 we analyze the difference between the decentralized
BGP and its socially optimal counterpart. Once again we show the pitfalls of ignoring the
fundamental factors. Finally, in Section 6 we conclude and outline the scope of further research.
3
2 The model
2.1 Households
Consider a continuum of infinitely-lived identical households with mass 1. The flow budget
constraint of the representative household is given by
a˙ = ra+ wl − c, (1)
where a refers to net assets, r denotes the real rental rate of physical capital, which is equal
to the real interest rate because we abstract from depreciation, w is the real wage, l refers to
hours worked, and c denotes consumption.
Instantaneous utility depends not only on absolute consumption c, but also on relative
consumption c/C and/or on relative wealth a/A, where C denotes average consumption, while
A is average wealth. We restrict our attention to the case in which labor supply is exogenously
given so that the appropriate general specification of the instantaneous utility function takes
the form u = u (c, c/C, a/A). The representative household derives positive and diminishing
marginal utility from absolute consumption and nonnegative marginal utility from both relative
consumption and relative wealth:
uc > 0, ucc < 0, uc/C ≥ 0, ua/A ≥ 0, uc/C > 0 ∨ ua/A > 0. (2)
The last assumption given in (2) rules out the uninteresting specification in which neither
relative consumption nor relative wealth matter.2 It will prove helpful to use the fact that
instantaneous utility can be expressed as
V = V (c, C, a,A) ≡ u (c, c/C, a/A) . (3)
To ensure a well-behaved intertemporal optimization problem, we assume that the function
V (c, C, a,A) is i) strictly concave in c, and ii) jointly strictly concave in c and a in case relative
wealth matters for utility:
Vcc < 0, and VccVaa − (Vca)2 > 0 if ua/A > 0. (4)
The expressions for Vcc and VccVaa − (Vca)2 are given in Appendix A.1.
The representative household maximizes overall utility as given by
∫∞
0 e
−ρtu (c, c/C, a/A) dt,
where ρ denotes the discount rate, subject to the flow budget constraint (1) and the initial
condition a (0) = a0 by choosing the time path of absolute consumption c. An important aspect
of this optimization problem is that the representative household takes not only the time paths
of the real wage w and the real interest rate r, but also the time paths of average consumption
2The most common interpretation of relative consumption and relative wealth preferences is based on status
preferences in the sense that u (c, c/C, a/A) ≡ u˜ (c, s (c/C, a/A)). In this specification, instantaneous utility
depends positively on both absolute consumption c and status s, u˜c > 0 and u˜s > 0, while status depends
nonnegatively on relative consumption and relative wealth, sc/C ≥ 0 and sa/A ≥ 0, where, in addition, sc/C >
0∨ sa/A > 0 holds. Obviously, the general specification u = u (c, c/C, a/A) encompasses the status interpretation
but does not rule out alternative explanations.
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C and average wealth A as given. The current-value Hamiltonian of the optimization problem is
given by H = u (c, c/C, a/A)+λ (ra+ wl − c), where the costate variable λ denotes the shadow
price of absolute wealth. The necessary optimality conditions for an interior equilibrium, Hc = 0
and λ˙ = ρλ−Ha, can be written as
λ = uc (c, c/C, a/A) + uc/C (c, c/C, a/A)C
−1, (5)
λ˙ = − [rλ+ ua/A (c, c/C, a/A)A−1 − ρλ] . (6)
The assumptions given in (4) ensure that if the transversality condition
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtλa = 0 (7)
is satisfied, then the necessary optimality conditions (5) and (6) are also sufficient.
From the first-order conditions it follows that the growth rate of the costate variable λ is
λ˙
λ
= −
[
r +
ua/A (c, c/C, a/A)A
−1
uc (c, c/C, a/A) + uc/C (c, c/C, a/A)C−1
− ρ
]
. (8)
The sum of the first two terms within square brackets is the effective rate of return, where the
first term, r, is the standard market rate of return, while the second term measures the extra
return that results from social comparisons based on relative wealth and relative consumption.
For the sake of brevity, we henceforth use the compact notion comparison-induced extra return.
To provide a thorough economic interpretation of the comparison-induced extra return,
we first employ (3) to rewrite the first-order conditions (5) and (6) as λ = Vc (c, C, a,A) and
λ˙ = − [λr + Va (c, C, a,A)− ρλ]. This, in turn, implies that (8) can also be expressed as
λ˙
λ
= −
[
r +
Va (c, C, a,A)
Vc (c, C, a,A)
− ρ
]
. (9)
From
− ua/AA
−1
uc + uc/CC−1
= −Va
Vc
=
dc
da
∣∣∣∣
dV=0,dC=dA=0
it is then obvious that the comparison-induced extra return is the marginal rate of substitution
(MRS) of absolute wealth a for absolute consumption c. Hence, it tells us the amount of ab-
solute consumption c that the consumer – who takes both average consumption C and average
wealth A as given – would be willing to give up for a one-unit marginal increase in absolute
wealth a. The derivation and interpretation of this MRS are straightforward: On the one hand,
for a given value of A, an increase in absolute wealth da > 0 leads to a rise in relative wealth
a/A as given by d (a/A) = A−1da > 0. As long as relative wealth matters for utility so that
ua/A > 0, the resulting increase in instantaneous utility is given by Vada = ua/AA
−1da > 0. On
the other hand, for a given value of average consumption C, a decrease in absolute consumption
dc < 0 is accompanied by a fall in relative consumption c/C as given by d (c/C) = C−1dc < 0.
If relative consumption matters for utility so that uc/C > 0, then not only the fall in abso-
lute consumption, but also the decline in relative consumption causes instantaneous utility to
decrease with the total effect being Vcdc =
[
uc + uc/CC
−1] dc < 0. Obviously, instantaneous
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utility remains unchanged if and only if the change in absolute consumption satisfies the con-
dition that dc = − (Va/Vc) da = −ua/AA−1
[
uc + uc/CC
−1]−1 da. Please note that the presence
of relative consumption preferences exerts ceteris paribus a negative effect on the magnitude
of the MRS of a for c. In other words, the consumer is willing to forgo a smaller amount of
absolute consumption because the fall in c is associated with a decrease in relative consumption
c/C where the latter effect leads to an additional reduction in instantaneous utility.
It is decisive for the rest of the paper to rewrite (8) as
λ˙
λ
= −
[
r +
ma/A (c, c/C, a/A)
1 +mc/C (c, c/C, a/A)
× c
a
− ρ
]
, (10)
where
mx = mx (c, c/C, a/A) ≡ x
c
× ux (c, c/C, a/A)
uc (c, c/C, a/A)
, for x =
c
C
,
a
A
. (11)
Obviously, ux/uc is the standard marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of x for absolute con-
sumption c, where x is either relative consumption or relative wealth. From
dc
dx
∣∣∣∣
du=0
= −ux
uc
⇒ dc/c
dx/x
∣∣∣∣
du=0
= −x
c
× ux
uc
= −mx, for x = c
C
,
a
A
it follows that mx ≥ 0 is the percentage-MRS of x for c. More precisely, mc/C refers to the
percent of absolute consumption c the consumer would be willing to forgo to raise relative
consumption c/C by one percent for a given value of relative wealth a/A. Analogously, the
term ma/A refers to the percent of absolute consumption c the household would be willing to
sacrifice to raise relative wealth a/A by one percent for a given value of relative consumption
c/C. The assumptions that we introduce below to ensure the existence of a BGP imply that
the percentage-MRS (mx) – in contrast to the standard MRS (ux/uc) – is constant along the
BGP. Due to this advantage we henceforth employ the percentage-MRS instead of its standard
counterpart.
Obviously, mc/C and ma/A are appropriate measures of the strength of the relative consump-
tion motive and the relative wealth motive, respectively. In addition, if relative consumption
matters for utility, mc/C > 0, then 0 ≤ ma/A/mc/C <∞. This ratio represents the percentage-
MRS of relative wealth a/A for relative consumption c/C. It gives the percent of relative
consumption c/C the consumer would be willing to sacrifice to raise relative wealth a/A by one
percent for a given value of absolute consumption c.
Remark 1. An alternative economic interpretation of the terms between brackets on the right-
hand side of (10) can be found in Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2008). These authors follow
Futagami and Shibata (1998) and dub an expression that is analogous to
ρ− m
a/A (c, c/C, a/A)
1 +mc/C (c, c/C, a/A)
× c
a
,
(but does not employ the concept of the percentage-MRS of a/A or c/C for c) as the effective
discount rate. On page 316 they state: “. . . seeking greater social status in wealth makes people
more patient, whereas seeking greater social status in consumption makes them more impatient.”
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In this paper we prefer to employ the concept of the effective rate of return that also occurs in
the transversality condition (13) given below.
The introduction of mc/C and ma/A has further implications for the representation of equa-
tions and conditions. For instance, the first-order condition (5) with respect to the optimal
choice of absolute consumption c can be rewritten as
λ = uc (c, c/C, a/A)
[
1 +mc/C (c, c/C, a/A)
]
. (12)
This equation shows that the total marginal utility of c, Vc = uc + C
−1uc/C , that takes into
account that a change in c affects both absolute and relative consumption, can be represented
as the product of the marginal utility of absolute consumption uc and the factor 1 +m
c/C .
Moreover, both mc/C and ma/A appear in the transversality condition. The assumptions
that uc > 0 and uc/C ≥ 0 together with the first-order condition (5) imply that λ (t) > 0 for
t ≥ 0. Hence, integration of (10) shows that the transversality condition (7) is equivalent to
lim
t→∞ exp
{
−
∫ t
0
[
r (v) +
ma/A (v)
1 +mc/C (v)
× c (v)
a (v)
]
dv
}
a (t) = 0, (13)
where mx (v) = mx (c (v) , c (v) /C (v) , a (v) /A (v)) for x = c/C and a/A. This modified
transversality condition differs from its counterpart in the standard model in that the market
rate of return is replaced by the effective rate of return. However, if relative wealth is irrelevant
for utility so that ma/A = 0, then the effective rate of return simplifies to the market rate of
return. Consequently, if ma/A = 0, then the transversality condition equals its counterpart of
the standard model even if relative consumption matters for utility so that mc/C > 0.
2.2 Production
There is a continuum of firms with mass 1. To allow for the occurrence of long-run endoge-
nous growth in the simplest way possible, we follow Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995, Subsection
4.3), which is inspired by Arrow (1962) and Romer (1986). The production function of the
representative firm is given by y = f (k,Bl), where y is output, k refers to input of physical
capital, l denotes labor input, B is an index of knowledge available to the firm, and Bl denotes
effective labor input. The assumptions made by Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) allow them to
set B = K, where in this context K is interpreted as the aggregate capital stock of the economy.
This simple production structure leads to a model that is – with respect to all aspects that are
relevant for our analysis – isomorphic to more sophisticated models in which long-run economic
growth is endogenously explained by purposeful R&D investments (see, for example, Romer,
1990).3
The production function has the standard neoclassical properties of i) positive and dimin-
ishing marginal products with respect to each input, ii) constant returns to scale, and iii) they
fulfill the Inada conditions. There is perfect competition in all markets and the representative
3The effects of relative wealth preferences in the Romer (1990) model are analyzed in Hof and Prettner
(2019). In the working paper version of this article (Hof and Prettner, 2016), relative consumption preferences
are analyzed, too.
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firm maximizes its profit by optimally choosing capital input k and labor input l, with the ser-
vices of these two production factors being rented from households. Since there is a continuum
of firms, the representative firm takes not only the rental rate of capital r and the real wage
w, but also the available stock of knowledge B (= K) as given. The corresponding first order
conditions for a profit maximum can be written as
r = fk (k,Kl) , w = f(Bl) (k,Kl)K, (14)
where fk and f(Bl) denote the marginal products of k and effective labor input Bl, respectively.
Hence, f(Bl)×B gives the marginal product of l. The conditions given by (14) require that each
input is utilized up to the point at which its marginal product equals its real price.
3 The decentralized solution – General results of the funda-
mental factor approach
3.1 General features of the symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium
We follow the status literature with homogeneous individuals in which it is common practice
to proceed with the analysis of the symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium.4 Since both the
mass of households and the mass of firms are normalized to unity, aggregate values of output,
capital, labor, consumption, and wealth equal the corresponding average values denoted by Y ,
K, L, C, and A. In other words, aggregate and average values can be used interchangeably.
In a macroeconomic equilibrium in which all markets clear, the rental rate r and the real wage
w are endogenously determined by the following equations (for a detailed proof see Appendix
B.1):
r = fk (1, L) , w = f(Bl) (1, L)K. (15)
Please note that L is treated as given, since we restrict our attention to the case in which labor
supply is exogenous.
By assumption, private households are identical in every respect. Hence, in any symmetric
macroeconomic equilibrium they make identical choices. Net loans of any household to other
households and to firms are zero so that physical capital is the only store of households’ wealth.
Consequently, we have
c = C, a = A = K, l = L. (16)
Substituting (16) into the flow budget constraint of the representative household (1) and taking
into account that rK + wL = Y = f (1, L)K holds due to constant returns to scale, we can
show that the economy-wide resource constraint is given by K˙ = Y −C = f (1, L)K−C. Thus,
the dynamic evolution of aggregate capital K is governed by the following differential equation
(for a detailed proof see Appendix B.2):
K˙/K = f (1, L)− C/K. (17)
4Carroll et al. (1997) and Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) are exceptions.
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Substituting (15) and (16) into (12) and (10), we obtain
λ = uc (C, 1, 1)
[
1 +mc/C (C, 1, 1)
]
, (18)
λ˙
λ
= −
[
fk (1, L) +
ma/A (C, 1, 1)
1 +mc/C (C, 1, 1)
× C
K
− ρ
]
. (19)
We carry the analysis out in the control-state space in which attention is focused on the
behavior of aggregate consumption C and aggregate capital K by substituting for the shadow
price of wealth λ. In this approach, the Euler equation for aggregate consumption in the
symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium plays a decisive role. Differentiating (18) with respect
to time t, substituting the resulting expression for λ˙/λ into (19), and solving for C˙/C we obtain
C˙
C
= σD (C)
[
fk (1, L) + η
D (C)× C
K
− ρ
]
, (20)
where
σD (C) ≡ −
[
εuc,c (C, 1, 1) +
mc/C (C, 1, 1)
1 +mc/C (C, 1, 1)
× εmc/C ,c (C, 1, 1)
]−1
(21)
denotes the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the decentralized economy (the
superscript “D” stands for “Decentralized”), while
ηD (C) ≡ m
a/A (C, 1, 1)
1 +mc/C (C, 1, 1)
(22)
denotes the comparison-induced extra return factor. In (21), εuc,c ≡ cucc/uc and εmc/C ,c ≡
cm
c/C
c /mc/C are the elasticities of the marginal utility of absolute consumption uc and of the
percentage-MRS of relative consumption for absolute consumption mc/C with respect to abso-
lute consumption c. Here, both elasticities are evaluated at (c, c/C, a/A) = (C, 1, 1) due to the
consideration of a symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium. The factor ηD (C) captures the direct
effects of both relative consumption and relative wealth preferences on the comparison-induced
extra return given by ηD (C)× (C/K). It will become obvious that these preferences also exert
an indirect effect by influencing the equilibrium level of the consumption-capital ratio C/K.
Please note that neither the relative consumption motive nor the relative wealth motive affect
the market rate of return fk (1, L), since we restrict our attention to the case in which labor
supply is exogenously given.
Finally, substituting (15) and (16) into (13) and using (22) it is easily verified that in a
symmetric macroeconomic equilibrium the transversality condition can be written as
lim
t→∞ exp
{
−
∫ t
0
[
fk (1, L) + η
D (C (v))× C (v)
K (v)
]
dv
}
K (t) = 0. (23)
Hence, in the control-state space analysis, the dynamic evolution of C and K is governed by the
differential equations (17) and (20), the transversality condition (23), and the initial condition
K (0) = K0.
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The differential equations (17) and (20) contain the terms f (1, L) and fk (1, L), respectively.
For various results derived in the rest of the paper it is of crucial importance that (for a proof
see Appendix B.3)
f (1, L) > fk (1, L) . (24)
For given employment L, fk (1, L) gives the constant value of the private marginal product of
capital in the decentralized equilibrium. In the decentralized economy, the expression f (1, L) =
Y/K has a single meaning: it describes the constant average product of capital (i.e., the ratio
of aggregate production Y to aggregate capital K). In the socially planned economy discussed
in section 5, f (1, L) also represents the social marginal product of capital, i.e., the marginal
product as perceived by the social planner that internalizes the knowledge spillovers resulting
from the capital accumulation of individual firms.
3.2 Balanced growth path (BGP) – Existence and Properties
In the following we provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an economically meaningful
BGP in the decentralized economy and analyze its properties. Henceforth, we use the term
“economically meaningful BGP” to describe a BGP in which 1) the growth rate is strictly
positive, 2) the consumption-capital ratio is strictly positive, and 3) the transversality condition
is satisfied.
Proposition 1. (Decentralized BGP – The roles of σD and ηD)
A) If i) the specification of the instantaneous utility function u = u (c, c/C, a/A) has the
property that both the decentralized effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution and
the comparison-induced extra return factor are independent of C such that
σD (C) = σˆ, ηD (C) = ηˆ, ∀C > 0, (25)
where σˆ > 0 and ηˆ ≥ 0 are constants and ii) the condition
max
{
[1− (1/σˆ)] [fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L)]
1 + ηˆ
, 0
}
< ρ < fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L) (26)
is satisfied, then an economically meaningful BGP exists in the decentralized economy.
Along the BGP the common growth rate of consumption and capital gD = (C˙/C)D =
(K˙/K)D and the consumption-capital ratio (C/K)D are given by:
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
> 0, (27)
(C/K)D =
(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
> 0. (28)
B) The model has no transitional dynamics.
For a proof of Proposition 1 see Appendix B.4. From Equations (27)–(28) it is obvious
that the common growth rate gD and the consumption-capital ratio (C/K)D are completely
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determined by the following five mathematical expressions/parameters: f (1, L), fk (1, L), ρ, σˆ,
and ηˆ. Hence, the same is true for the comparison-induced extra return ηˆ × (C/K)D. Since
labor supply L is exogenously given by assumption, relative consumption and relative wealth
preferences affect the BGP, if at all, only via the σˆ-channel and/or the ηˆ-channel. For this
reason, it is very important to thoroughly understand the operation of these two channels. The
following proposition and the subsequent interpretation provide the relevant details.
Proposition 2. (The dependence of the decentralized BGP on σˆ and ηˆ)
In the decentralized economy the growth rate gD depends positively on both the effective
elasticity of intertemporal substitution σˆ and the comparison-induced extra return factor ηˆ, while
the opposite results obtain for the consumption-capital ratio (C/K)D.
The comparison-induced extra return ηˆ × (C/K)D depends positively on ηˆ. Moreover, if
ηˆ > 0, then it depends negatively on σˆ. However, if ηˆ = 0, then it is independent of σˆ because
ηˆ × (C/K)D = 0 holds for all σˆ > 0. In mathematical terms, we have
∂gD
∂σˆ
> 0,
∂(C/K)D
∂σˆ
< 0, sgn
(
∂
[
ηˆ × (C/K)D]
∂σˆ
)
= −sgn (ηˆ) , (29)
∂gD
∂ηˆ
> 0,
∂(C/K)D
∂ηˆ
< 0,
∂
[
ηˆ × (C/K)D]
∂ηˆ
> 0. (30)
For a proof of the mathematical assertions made in (29) and (30) see Appendix B.5. The
economic interpretation of the implied qualitative dependence of the BGP on σˆ and ηˆ is mainly
based on the equation
gD = σˆ
[
fk (1, L) + ηˆ × (C/K)D − ρ
]
(31)
that is obtained by substituting (C˙/C)D = gD into the steady-state version of the Euler equation
for aggregate consumption given by (20).
First, we provide the interpretation for the dependence of the BGP on σˆ. According to
(31) a ceteris paribus increase in the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution σˆ exerts
a direct effect on the decentralized growth rate gD and, if ηˆ > 0 holds, also an indirect effect
via the reaction of (C/K)D. The direct effect results from the fact that a rise in σˆ increases
the willingness of private households to substitute future absolute consumption for present
absolute consumption. In other words, there is an increase in the willingness to save which,
in turn, causes the common rate of growth of aggregate capital, consumption, and output to
rise. If ηˆ > 0 holds, there is also an indirect effect. The decrease in the aggregate consumption-
capital ratio (C/K)D that results from the rise in σˆ causes the comparison-induced extra return
ηˆ× (C/K)D and, hence, the effective rate of return, fk (1, L) + ηˆ× (C/K)D, to fall. The latter
effect dampens the incentives to save and thus exerts a negative effect on the accumulation of
capital. Since the positive direct effect exceeds the negative indirect effect, the decentralized
growth rate gD depends positively on σˆ.
Second, we explain the dependence of the BGP on ηˆ. A ceteris paribus rise in the comparison-
induced extra return factor ηˆ causes the extra return ηˆ×(C/K)D to increase, because the rise in
ηˆ is only partially offset by the fall in (C/K)D. The resulting rise in the effective rate of return,
fk (1, L) + ηˆ × (C/K)D, enhances the incentives to save and thus boosts the accumulation of
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capital. Hence, the decentralized growth rate gD depends positively on ηˆ.
In the next two propositions that build on the results given above we dig deeper by con-
sidering explicitly both the strength of the relative consumption motive and the strength of
the relative wealth motive. In this context the definitions of σD (C) and ηD (C) given by (21)
and (22) play a crucial role. Henceforth, we use the term “symmetric situations” to describe
situations in which c = C and a = A hold so that c/C = 1 and a/A = 1.
Proposition 3. (Decentralized BGP – The roles of mc/C , ma/A, and |εuc,c|)
If the instantaneous utility function u = u (c, c/C, a/A) exhibits the property that in sym-
metric situations mc/C , ma/A, and εuc,c are constant functions of C so that
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C , ma/A (C, 1, 1) = mˆa/A, εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c, ∀C > 0, (32)
where mˆc/C ≥ 0, mˆa/A ≥ 0 (with max{mˆc/C , mˆa/A} > 0), and εˆuc,c < 0 are constants, then the
two conditions given in (25) [Proposition 1] are satisfied, since
σD (C) =
1
|εˆuc,c| ≡ σˆ, η
D (C) =
mˆa/A
1 + mˆc/C
≡ ηˆ, ∀C > 0. (33)
If, in addition, the condition (26) given in Proposition 1 is satisfied for the values of σˆ and ηˆ
defined by (33), then an economically meaningful decentralized BGP exists. The corresponding
BGP growth rate is given by
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ mˆ
a/A
1 + mˆc/C
× f (1, L)
|εˆuc,c|+ mˆ
a/A
1 + mˆc/C
. (34)
For a proof of Proposition 3 see Appendix B.6. In general, the constant ηˆ depends on both
mˆc/C and mˆa/A, where the latter two constants measure the strength of the relative consumption
motive and the relative wealth motive, respectively, in symmetric situations. Consequently,
mˆc/C and mˆa/A yield only local information about the strength of the corresponding motives.
Below we discuss six specifications of the instantaneous utility function u = u (c, c/C, a/A)
in which the condition (32) is satisfied. In four out of these six illustrations the functions
mc/C (c, c/C, a/A) and ma/A (c, c/C, a/A) are constant functions over their whole domains so
that mˆc/C and mˆa/A are also measures of the global strength of the relative consumption motive
and the relative wealth motive, respectively.
The constant σˆ = 1/ |εˆuc,c| measures the willingness to substitute absolute consumption
intertemporally in symmetric situations. It depends neither on mˆc/C nor on mˆa/A. While
according to (21) the independence of σD on the strength of the relative wealth motive is a
general property of the model, the irrelevance of mˆc/C for σˆ results from an assumption that we
made in (32) to ensure the existence of a BGP, namely that mc/C (C, 1, 1) is a constant function
of C. For details see the proof of Proposition 3.
Equation (34) plays a decisive role in the rest of the paper. It shows that the decentralized
growth rate gD can be ultimately represented as a function of f (1, L), fk (1, L), ρ, mˆ
a/A, mˆc/C ,
and |εˆuc,c|. Henceforth, these six terms are called the “fundamental factors” of growth in the de-
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centralized economy. Obviously, these fundamental factors are also the ultimate determinants of
the associated consumption-capital ratio (C/K)D = f (1, L)−gD and the resulting comparison-
induced extra return ηˆ × (C/K)D. In the following proposition we analyze the implications of
ceteris paribus changes in the three fundamental factors that depend on the specification of the
instantaneous utility function u = u (c, c/C, a/A), namely mˆa/A, mˆc/C , and |εˆuc,c|.
Proposition 4. (The dependence of the decentralized growth rate gD given by Equation (34)
on the fundamental factors mˆa/A, mˆc/C , and |εˆuc,c|)
i) gD depends positively on the strength of the relative wealth motive (in symmetric situa-
tions) as measured by mˆa/A, where mˆa/A affects gD exclusively via the ηˆ-channel:
∂gD
∂mˆa/A
=
∂gD
∂ηˆ
× ∂ηˆ
∂mˆa/A
=
∂gD
∂ηˆ
× 1
1 + mˆc/C
> 0. (35)
ii) If relative wealth matters for utility so that mˆa/A > 0, then gD depends negatively on
the strength of the relative consumption motive (in symmetric situations) as measured by
mˆc/C , where mˆc/C affects gD exclusively via the ηˆ-channel. However, if relative wealth is
irrelevant for utility so that mˆa/A = 0 and, hence, ηˆ = 0, then gD is independent of mˆc/C :
∂gD
∂mˆc/C
=
∂gD
∂ηˆ
× ∂ηˆ
∂mˆc/C
= −∂g
D
∂ηˆ
× mˆ
a/A(
1 + mˆc/C
)2 ≤ 0
⇒ sgn
(
∂gD
∂mˆc/C
)
= −sgn
(
mˆa/A
)
. (36)
iii) gD depends negatively on the absolute value of the elasticity of the marginal utility of ab-
solute consumption with respect to absolute consumption (in symmetric situations) |εˆuc,c|,
where |εˆuc,c| affects gD exclusively via the σˆ-channel:
∂gD
∂ |εˆuc,c| =
∂gD
∂σˆ
× ∂σˆ
∂ |εˆuc,c| = −
∂gD
∂σˆ
× 1|εˆuc,c|2 < 0. (37)
The mathematical results given in (35)–(37) are easily obtained by 1) using the chain rule
of differentiation, 2) calculating the partial derivatives of ηˆ = mˆa/A/
(
1 + mˆc/C
)
with respect to
mˆa/A and mˆc/C , and the derivative of σˆ = 1/ |εˆuc,c| with respect to |εˆuc,c|, and 3) making use
of the fact that ∂gD/∂σˆ > 0 and ∂gD/∂ηˆ > 0 hold according to Proposition 2. The economic
interpretation of the results given in Proposition 4 is straightforward.
i) A ceteris paribus increase in the constant mˆa/A that measures the strength of the relative
wealth motive (in symmetric situations) influences the common growth rate gD exclusively
via the resulting increase in the comparison-induced extra return parameter ηˆ. According to
Proposition 2 the rise in ηˆ causes the comparison-induced extra return ηˆ× (C/K)D to increase,
because the rise in ηˆ is only partially offset by the fall in (C/K)D. The resulting rise in the
effective rate of return, fk (1, L) + ηˆ× (C/K)D, enhances the incentives to save and thus boosts
economic growth. Hence, gD depends positively on mˆa/A.
ii) A ceteris paribus increase in the constant mˆc/C that measures the strength of the relative
consumption motive (in symmetric situations) affects the common growth rate gD, if at all, solely
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via its influence on the comparison-induced extra return parameter ηˆ. We have to distinguish
between two cases. Case 1: If relative wealth matters for utility so that mˆa/A > 0, then a rise
in mˆc/C causes ηˆ to decrease. According to Proposition 2, the fall in ηˆ causes the comparison-
induced extra return ηˆ × (C/K)D to decrease. The resulting fall in the effective rate of return,
fk (1, L) + ηˆ × (C/K)D, attenuates the incentives to save and thus reduces economic growth.
Hence, gD depends negatively on mˆc/C . Case 2: If relative wealth is irrelevant for utility so
that mˆa/A = 0 and ηˆ = 0, then changes in mˆc/C do not affect the decentralized growth rate gD,
because in this case not only σˆ but also ηˆ is independent of mˆc/C .
iii) A ceteris paribus change in the absolute value of the elasticity of the marginal utility
of absolute consumption with respect to absolute consumption (in symmetric situations) |εˆuc,c|
affects the decentralized growth rate exclusively via the resulting change in the effective elasticity
of intertemporal substitution σˆ: A rise in |εˆuc,c| causes σˆ to decrease which, according to
Proposition 2, leads to a fall in gD.
Propositions 3 and 4 are crucial results that are used several times below to derive further in-
sights.5 Proposition 3 yields a representation of the decentralized growth rate that is robust with
respect to the specification of the instantaneous utility function as long as u = u (c, c/C, a/A)
satisfies the quite weak conditions that are given in (32) [Proposition 3]. Proposition 4 allows
to study the effects of ceteris paribus changes in the strength of the relative consumption and
relative wealth motives. We show below that there are instances in which such ceteris paribus
thought experiments cannot be carried out within the standard approach that does not identify
the fundamental factors but restricts attention to the parameters of the utility function. Con-
sequently, the standard analysis is prone to erroneous conclusions whenever it employs utility
functions in which the change in a single parameter does not constitute a change in a single
fundamental factor. For example, a prominent specification used in the status literature has the
property that the parameter that seems to determine the strength of the relative consumption
motive actually affects not only mˆc/C , but also mˆa/A and |εˆuc,c|.
After having presented these four propositions, the crucial question is whether there exist
specifications of u = u (c, c/C, a/A) that satisfy the sufficient conditions for the existence of
a BGP given by (25) in Proposition 1 and (32) in Proposition 3. The following proposition
answers this question in the affirmative. It presents a quite general specification of u that
encompasses several prominent specifications used in the literature.
Proposition 5. (A general specification of u (c, c/C, a/A) that ensures the existence of an
economically meaningful BGP)
Let the instantaneous utility function have the form
u (c, c/C, a/A) =
1
1− θ
{[
cξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
]1−θ − 1} , (38)
where ξ1 and θ are parameters, while Q (·, ·) denotes a function.
5The results given in i) and ii) of Proposition 4 are consistent with those derived in the seminal contribution
by Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2008) for the case of an exogenously given labor supply. We go beyond their
framework by 1) introducing the concept of the fundamental factors, 2) identifying utility functions (that play
a prominent role in the status literature) in which the standard approach is prone to erroneous conclusions, 3)
considering also the socially planned economy, and 4) offering alternative economic interpretations.
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A) If the parameters θ and ξ1 satisfy the conditions
ξ1 > 0, θ > 0, 1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 > 0 (39)
and, in addition, the function Q (c/C, a/A) exhibits the property that
Q > 0, Qc/C ≥ 0, Qa/A ≥ 0, Qc/C > 0 ∨Qa/A > 0 (40)
hold over its domain denoted by ΘQ, then the instantaneous utility function given by (38)
is well-behaved in the sense that all assumptions made in (2) are satisfied.
B) Let εQ,c/C ≡ (c/C)Qc/C/Q, and εQ,a/A ≡ (a/A)Qa/A/Q denote the elasticities of the
function Q (c/C, a/A) with respect to c/C and a/A, respectively. The instantaneous utility
function given by (38) satisfies the three conditions given in (32) [Proposition 3], since
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C , ma/A (C, 1, 1) = mˆa/A, εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c
hold for C > 0, where
mˆc/C =
εˆQ,c/C
ξ1
≥ 0, mˆa/A = εˆ
Q,a/A
ξ1
≥ 0, εˆuc,c = − [1 + (θ − 1) ξ1] < 0, (41)
with εˆQ,c/C ≡ εQ,c/C (1, 1) and εˆQ,a/A ≡ εQ,a/A (1, 1). Consequently, the two conditions
given in (25) [Proposition 1] are satisfied, too:
σD (C) =
1
1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 ≡ σˆ > 0, η
D (C) =
εˆQ,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
≡ ηˆ ≥ 0, ∀C > 0. (42)
If the constants σˆ and ηˆ defined by (42) satisfy the condition (26) given in Proposition 1,
then an economically meaningful decentralized BGP exists. The corresponding constant
common growth rate is given by
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ εˆ
Q,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
× f (1, L)
1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 + εˆ
Q,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
> 0. (43)
In Appendix B.7, we provide a proof for an extended version of Proposition 5. The extended
version also contains the complicated conditions that the specification of u given by (38) has
to satisfy so that the alternative representation of preferences defined by (3), V (c, C, a,A) ≡
u (c, c/C, a/A), is well-behaved in the sense that all assumptions made in (4) are satisfied.
Moreover, it makes explicit the weak restrictions that we impose on u = u (c, c/C, a/A) in
Proposition 5 from the outset as well as the additional restrictions that need to be imposed to
ensure the existence of a BGP.6
6For the sake of robustness of the results, we intend to introduce initial restrictions with respect to the
specification of the instantaneous utility function u that are as weak as possible. The specification given by
(38) is obtained by considering the general case in which u results from the transformation of a multiplicatively
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In the next section we show that several specifications used in the literature can be inter-
preted as special cases of (38). Sometimes it will be even adequate to use the simplified version of
(38) that is obtained by assuming that Q (c/C, a/A) = (c/C)ξ2 (a/A)ξ3 . Please note that in this
special case the elasticities of the function Q are constant functions, i.e., εQ,c/C (c/C, a/A) = ξ2
and εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A) = ξ3 hold for all (c/C, a/A) ∈ ΘQ. Further implications of this specifica-
tion of Q (c/C, a/A) are summarized in the following corollary.
Corollary 1. (A simplified version of the general specification of the utility function (38) –
properties and implications for the BGP growth rate)
Let the instantaneous utility function take the form
u (c, c/C, a/A) =
1
1− θ
{[
cξ1 (c/C)ξ2 (a/A)ξ3
]1−θ − 1} , (44)
where
θ > 0, ξ1 > 0, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ3 ≥ 0, max {ξ2, ξ3} > 0, (45)
(1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3) < 1. (46)
A) The instantaneous utility function (44) and the resulting representation of preferences
given by V (c, C, a,A) ≡ u (c, c/C, a/A) are well-behaved in the sense that all assumptions
made in (2) and (4) are satisfied.
B) The expressions for mˆc/C , mˆa/A, and ηˆ given in (41) [Proposition 5] simplify to
mˆc/C = ξ2/ξ1 ≥ 0, mˆa/A = ξ3/ξ1 ≥ 0, ηˆ = ξ3/ξ1
1 + ξ2/ξ1
≥ 0, (47)
where max
{
mˆc/C , mˆa/A
}
> 0, while the expressions for εˆuc,c and σˆ given in (42) [Propo-
sition 5] remain unchanged:
εˆuc,c = − [1 + (θ − 1) ξ1] < 0, σˆ = 1
1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 > 0. (48)
C) The expression for the common growth rate given in (43) [Proposition 5] simplifies to
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ξ3/ξ1
1 + ξ2/ξ1
f (1, L)
1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 + ξ3/ξ1
1 + ξ2/ξ1
. (49)
The equations (47), (48), and (49) given in B) and C) are easily obtained by substituting
εˆQ,c/C = ξ2 and εˆ
Q,a/A = ξ3 into (41), (42), and (43) given in Proposition 5. By contrast,
the proof of A) requires tedious calculations that are provided in Appendix B.8. Please note
that under the specification (44) the constants mˆc/C (= ξ2/ξ1) and mˆ
a/A (= ξ3/ξ1) measure the
strength of the relative consumption motive and the relative wealth motive not only locally in
separable function in the sense that u (c, c/C, a/A) = T [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)], and showing that a BGP exists if
and only if the transformation T is of the CRRA type and P (c) is a power function.
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symmetric situations, but globally. This follows from the fact that both mc/C (c, c/C, a/A) and
ma/A (c, c/C, a/A) are constant functions over their whole domain.
In the next section we reexamine various specifications of relative consumption and relative
wealth preferences that are employed in the literature. All these specifications can be expressed
as special cases of (38) and (44), respectively. In this context, we put special emphasis on
providing explanations for the potential fallacies of the existing literature that result from its
ignorance of the fundamental factors. In this context, the exponent of absolute consumption
given by the parameter ξ1 plays a decisive role. We show that using the simplifying assumption
that ξ1 = 1 is not at all innocuous, because it implies a significant loss of generality. More
precisely, if ξ1 = 1, then the general specification (38) does not encompass one of the most
prominent specifications in the literature.
4 The decentralized solution – Utility functions used in the lit-
erature and potential fallacies of the standard analysis
4.1 Preliminaries
One of the main goals of this section is to show that the traditional method of analysis involves
the great risk of drawing erroneous conclusions. For instance, it will become obvious that one
of the most prominent specifications of the instantaneous utility function used in the literature
seems to allow for the possibility that relative consumption preferences enhance long-run growth.
Using our fundamental factor approach we show that such a conclusion is clearly at variance
with our Proposition 4 given above and is seriously flawed. For the explanation of this fallacy
the following properties of (38) [resp. (44)] that follow directly from Proposition 5 and Corollary
1 are decisive:
Corollary 2. (The effects of changes in the parameters of the utility functions (38) and (44)
on the fundamental factors)
A) Ceteris paribus changes in εˆQ,c/C ≡ εQ,c/C (1, 1) [resp. ξ2] affect only the percentage-MRS
of relative consumption mˆc/C .
B) Ceteris paribus changes in εˆQ,a/A ≡ εQ,a/A (1, 1) [resp. ξ3] exert solely an effect on the
percentage-MRS of relative wealth mˆa/A.
C) Ceteris paribus changes in θ influence exclusively the absolute value of the elasticity of
marginal utility of absolute consumption with respect to absolute consumption, |εˆuc,c|.
D) In contrast to εˆQ,c/C , εˆQ,a/A, and θ [resp. ξ2, ξ3, and θ], ceteris paribus changes in the
exponent of absolute consumption, ξ1, affect
i) mˆc/C , provided that εˆQ,c/C 6= 0 [resp. ξ2 6= 0],
ii) mˆa/A, provided that εˆQ,a/A 6= 0 [resp. ξ3 6= 0] and,
iii) |εˆuc,c|, provided that θ 6= 1.
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E) In the special case in which ξ1 = 1 holds, we have
mˆc/C = εˆQ,c/C , mˆa/A = εˆQ,a/A, |εˆuc,c| = θ, and (50)
mˆc/C = ξ2, mˆ
a/A = ξ3, |εˆuc,c| = θ, (51)
which, in turn, implies that there is a one-to-one correspondence between the three funda-
mental factors mˆc/C , mˆa/A, and |εˆuc,c| and the three parameters given by εˆQ,c/C , εˆQ,a/A,
and θ [resp. ξ2, ξ3, θ].
Point D) implies that ceteris paribus changes in ξ1 may alter the willingness to substitute
1) relative consumption for absolute consumption, 2) relative wealth for absolute consumption,
and 3) future absolute consumption for current absolute consumption. This property leads to
complications and erroneous conclusions with respect to the implications of relative consumption
and relative wealth preferences in case that a specification of the (44)-type is employed in which
the parameters ξ1, ξ2, ξ3, and θ are tied by a functional dependence.
A simple, but quite relevant example of functional dependence is given by the special case
in which ξ1 = 1 − ξ2 − ξ3 holds, where ξ2 > 0 and ξ3 > 0 are independent parameters. This
specification implies that instantaneous utility depends on a geometric weighted average of
absolute consumption, relative consumption, and relative wealth. The decisive feature of this
specification is that any rise in the exponents of either relative consumption, ξ2, or relative
wealth, ξ3, is inevitably associated with a fall in the exponent of absolute consumption, ξ1 =
1−ξ2−ξ3. This property implies that a rise in the exponent of relative consumption, ξ2, must not
be interpreted as a ceteris paribus increase in the strength of the relative consumption motive
that is measured correctly by the percentage-MRS mˆc/C = ξ2/ξ1. The fall in ξ1 = 1−ξ2−ξ3 not
only reinforces the increase in mˆc/C , but also raises the strength of the relative wealth motive
as measured by the percentage-MRS mˆa/A = ξ3/ξ1 and, in addition, affects |εˆuc,c| provided that
θ 6= 1. Hence, if ξ1 = 1 − ξ2 − ξ3 holds, then a ceteris paribus rise in the exponent of relative
consumption, ξ2, is not equivalent to as a ceteris paribus increase in the strength of the relative
consumption motive. The literature, however, seems to be unaware of this non-equivalence even
in the pure relative consumption case in which ξ3 = 0 and ξ1 = 1− ξ2 hold.
We find it helpful to illustrate and elucidate the possibility of erroneous conclusions in the
presence of a functional dependence of the parameters by means of a compact mathematical
representation. To keep this representation simple without impairing the main message we
consider the case in which i) the instantaneous utility function is of the form given by (44),
and ii) both ξ1 and ξ3 depend on the exponent of relative consumption ξ2, ξ1 = ξ1 (ξ2), and
ξ3 = ξ3 (ξ2), while ξ2 and θ are treated as independent parameters.
7 Taking into account that
according to (34), gD depends on the six fundamental factors mˆc/C , mˆa/A, |εˆuc,c|, f (1, L),
fk (1, L), and ρ, where the last three arguments are independent of ξ2, and that according to
(47) and (48), mˆc/C = ξ2/ξ1, mˆ
a/A = ξ3/ξ1, and |εˆuc,c| = 1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 hold, it is obvious that
7Things become more complicated if the specification of u exhibits the property that the parameter ξ2 itself
is a function of other parameters pi1, . . . , pim, ξ2 = ξ2 (pi1, . . . , pim), and the same is true for the parameters ξ1,
ξ3, and θ. For details, see Appendix C.1.
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the total derivative of the common growth rate with respect to ξ2 is given by
dgD
dξ2
=
∂gD
∂mˆc/C
· dmˆ
c/C
dξ2
+
∂gD
∂mˆa/A
· dmˆ
a/A
dξ2
+
∂gD
∂ |εˆuc,c| ·
d |εˆuc,c|
dξ2
=
∂gD
∂mˆc/C
(
1
ξ1
− ξ2
ξ21
dξ1
dξ2
)
+
∂gD
∂mˆa/A
(
1
ξ1
dξ3
dξ2
− ξ3
ξ21
dξ1
dξ2
)
+
∂gD
∂ |εˆuc,c| (θ − 1)
dξ1
dξ2
. (52)
Recall that according to our fundamental factor approach [see Proposition 4, Equation (36)],
the correct measure to assess the effects of relative consumption preferences on the common
growth rate gD is given by the partial derivative ∂gD/∂mˆc/C . The standard approach, however,
confines the analysis to the calculation of dgD/dξ2. In this context, the standard approach is
unaware of the decomposition given by the right-hand side of equation (52), which expresses
in mathematical terms the idea described above that a change in the exponent of relative
consumption ξ2 might affect the common growth rate not only via the fundamental factor
mˆc/C but also via the fundamental factors mˆa/A and |εˆuc,c|. If either ξ1 or both ξ1 and ξ3
depend on ξ2, then an analysis that uses the derivative dg
D/dξ2 to assess the effects of relative
consumption preferences on the common growth rate involves two sources of error: First, the
sign of dgD/dξ2 may deviate from the sign of ∂g
D/∂mˆc/C . While according to Proposition 4,
∂gD/∂mˆc/C ≤ 0 holds for all instantaneous utility functions that satisfy (32), we show below
that well-known specifications exist in which we cannot rule out that dgD/dξ2 > 0 holds. This
leads to the erroneous conclusion that relative consumption preferences might enhance BGP
growth. Second, even if the sign of dgD/dξ2 equals the sign of ∂g
D/∂mˆc/C , the economic
interpretation of the result is not correct, because it ignores the influence of ξ2 via the mˆ
a/A-
and the |εˆuc,c|-channels.
4.2 The Pure Relative Consumption Case
In this subsection we consider three specifications of pure relative consumption preferences in
which relative wealth does not matter at all for utility. From Proposition 4 we know that in
the absence of the relative wealth motive the common growth rate gD is independent of the
strength of the relative consumption motive. We show that two of the three specifications seem
to yield contradictory results if the analysis is carried out by means of the standard approach.
Specification #1: Both in the status and in the habit persistence literature, the following
specification is widely used:
V (c,H) =
1
1− θ
[(
c/Hβ
)1−θ − 1] , 0 < β < 1, (53)
where H denotes the household’s reference level. The simplest version of (53) results from the
assumption that the reference level is given by average consumption in the economy, H = C.
The resulting version of (53), V (c, C), corresponds to the following specification of pure relative
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consumption preferences:8
u (c, c/C) =
1
1− θ
{[
c1−β (c/C)β
]1−θ − 1} . (54)
According to (54), the representative household derives utility from a geometric weighted aver-
age of absolute and relative consumption. In case of β = 0, relative consumption is irrelevant
so that only absolute consumption matters. The greater the parameter β, the more important
is relative consumption as compared to absolute consumption. Note that changes in the pa-
rameter β affect not only the exponent of relative consumption c/C, but also the exponent of
absolute consumption c given by 1− β.
Obviously, (54) is a special case of our specification (44) that is obtained by setting ξ2 = β,
ξ1 = 1− ξ2 = 1− β, and ξ3 = 0. Hence, according to (47), (48), and (49) we have
mˆc/C =
β
1− β , mˆ
a/A = 0, |εˆuc,c| = 1 + (θ − 1) (1− β) ,
σˆ =
1
1 + (θ − 1) (1− β) , ηˆ = 0, g
D =
fk (1, L)− ρ
1 + (θ − 1) (1− β) .
From the solution of the decentralized growth rate it follows that gD depends positively (neg-
atively) on β if θ > 1 (θ < 1). Employing the standard approach and restricting the analysis
to the mere calculation of dgD/dβ, one could come to the conclusion that the specification of
u given by (54) allows for the possibility that the decentralized BGP growth rate is affected by
the strength of the relative consumption motive although relative wealth is irrelevant for utility.
Even more surprisingly, one could conclude that relative consumption preferences enhance GDP
growth. Obviously, these two misleading conclusions of the standard approach are at variance
with part ii) of Proposition 4 given in this paper.
From the considerations made above, the fallacy of the traditional approach is already clear:
it overlooks the fact that changes in the parameter β affect two fundamental factors, namely
mˆc/C and |εˆuc,c|. More precisely, an increase in the exponent of relative consumption given
by ξ2 = β is inevitably associated with a decrease in the exponent of absolute consumption
given by ξ1 = 1 − β. Both the rise in ξ2 = β and the fall in ξ1 = 1 − β cause the percentage-
MRS of relative consumption mˆc/C = ξ2/ξ1 to increase. However, this rise in mˆ
c/C does not
affect at all the comparison-induced extra return factor, since ηˆ = mˆa/A/
(
1 + mˆc/C
)
= 0
holds due to the assumption that relative wealth is irrelevant for utility (ξ3 = 0 ⇒ mˆa/A =
ξ3/ξ1 = 0). In addition, the fall in ξ1 = 1 − β leads to an ambiguous reaction of the effective
8Specifications that are equivalent to (54) are, for instance, used in Harbaugh (1996) [Equation (1)], Grossmann
(1998) [Equation (7)], Fisher and Hof (2000) [Equation (20)], Liu and Turnovsky (2005) [Equation (14b)], Garc´ıa-
Pen˜alosa and Turnovsky (2008) [Equation (22)], and Nakamoto (2009) [Equation (22)]. In other models that
employ (53), H is treated as predetermined stock variable that evolves over time. Carroll et al. (1997) and
Alvarez-Cuadrado et al. (2004) distinguish in this context between outward- and inward-looking agents. The case
of outward-looking households (external habits) is modeled by assuming that H˙ = γ (C −H), which, in turn,
implies that the reference stock H is calculated as an exponentially declining weighted average of past average
levels of consumption in the economy, H (t) = γ
∫ t
−∞ e
γ(τ−t)C (τ) dτ . The case of inward-looking households
(internal habits) is obtained by setting H˙ = γ (c−H) so that the household’s reference stock H is calculated as
an exponentially declining weighted average of her own past levels of consumption: H (t) = γ
∫ t
−∞ e
γ(τ−t)c (τ) dτ .
Koyuncu and Turnovsky (2010) restrict their attention to external habits. Chen (2007) considers only internal
habits, but uses a more complicated differential equation for H.
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elasticity of intertemporal substitution σˆ = 1/ |εˆuc,c| = 1/ [1 + (θ − 1) ξ1], where sgn(∂σˆ/∂β) =
−sgn(∂σˆ/∂ξ1) = sgn(θ − 1). For the case in which θ > 1 holds, the following results can be easily
derived (if θ < 1, then the opposite results obtain): A rise in β causes σˆ to increase. According
to (29), the rise in σˆ leads to an increase in the decentralized growth rate gD. Proposition 2
and its interpretation made it clear that – in general – the rise in σˆ exerts both a direct and an
indirect effect on gD. However, since ηˆ = 0, there is only the direct effect: The willingness of
private households to substitute future absolute consumption for present absolute consumption
increases. The resulting rise in the propensity to save stimulates the common rate of growth of
aggregate capital, consumption, and output.
Our analysis made it clear that the reaction of the growth rate does not result from the
change in the exponent of relative consumption, ξ2 = β. Instead, it is caused by the change in
the exponent of absolute consumption, ξ1 = 1 − β. If relative wealth is irrelevant for utility,
then this change in ξ1 = 1 − β affects the common growth rate only via its ambiguous effect
on the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution σˆ = 1/ [1 + (θ − 1) ξ1]. In other words,
the change in the willingness to substitute relative consumption for absolute consumption (i.e.,
the change in mˆc/C) does not exert any effect. Only the change in the willingness to substitute
absolute consumption intertemporally matters, where the sign of this effect depends on the sign
of θ − 1.
Specification #2: The specification of V (c, C) that is employed by Gal´ı (1994) is equiv-
alent to the following representation:
V (c, C) =
1
1− θ c
1−θCγθ, θ > 0, θ 6= 1, γ < 1.
In the context of the pure relative consumption approach, this representation of V (c, C) is
obtained under the assumption that u takes the following form:
u (c, c/C) =
1
1− θ
[
c[1−(1−γ)θ]/(1−θ) (c/C)−γθ/(1−θ)
]1−θ
. (55)
Obviously, (55) is obtained by setting ξ2 = −γθ/ (1− θ), ξ1 = 1 − ξ2, and ξ3 = 0 in the
representation of the instantaneous utility function given by (44) and ignoring the constant
term “−1”. Please note that in contrast to the specification #1 given by (54), the exponents of
both absolute consumption and relative consumption depend on the parameter θ of the CRRA
function. It is obvious that V (c, C) is well-behaved in the sense that Vc > 0 and Vcc < 0. To
ensure that u = u (c, c/C) satisfies all assumptions made in (2), uc > 0, ucc < 0, and uc/C > 0,
we have to introduce appropriate restrictions on the parameter γ for any given value of θ. In
Appendix C.2, we show that these restrictions depend on whether θ > 1 or θ < 1 holds:
Case A: θ > 1, 0 < γ <
θ − 1
θ
, Case B: θ < 1, −1− θ
θ
< γ < 0. (56)
Using (47), (48), and (49), it can be shown that εˆuc,c = − (1− γ) θ < 0, mˆa/A = 0, ηˆ = 0,
mˆc/C =
−γθ
1− (1− γ) θ > 0, σˆ =
1
(1− γ) θ > 0, g
D =
fk (1, L)− ρ
(1− γ) θ > 0.
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It is verified at first glance that the decentralized growth rate gD depends positively on the
parameter γ. Hence, restricting the analysis to the mere calculation of the partial derivative
∂gD/∂γ > 0, one could draw the erroneous conclusion that gD depends on the strength of
the relative consumption motive, although relative wealth is irrelevant for utility. Meanwhile
the reader is familiar with the reason for this potential fallacy. Changes in γ affect not only
ξ2, but also ξ1 = 1 − ξ2, and, hence, the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution σˆ =
1/ [1 + (θ − 1) ξ1] = 1/ [(1− γ) θ]. A rise in γ causes gD to rise unambiguously. The only
reason for this positive growth effect is that the willingness to substitute absolute consumption
intertemporally depends positively on γ. By contrast, the change in mˆc/C that results from
the rise in γ is irrelevant, since due to the absence of the relative wealth motive, we have
mˆa/A = 0 and, hence, ηˆ = 0, i.e., the comparison-induced extra return factor is identical
to zero, irrespective of the strength of the relative consumption motive as measured by the
percentage-MRS mˆc/C .
Specification #3: One of the illustrations employed by Liu and Turnovsky (2005) [see
equation (14a), p. 1110] is equivalent to
V (c, C) =
1
1− θ

[(
cϕ − κCϕ
1− κ
)1/ϕ]1−θ
− 1
 , 0 < κ < 1, 0 < 1− ϕ < θ. (57)
Considering the limiting case in which ϕ→ 1 and ignoring the irrelevant expression 1−κ in the
denominator, we get the specification that would obtain in Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) [see p.
357] if – in contrast to the authors’ assumption – work effort were not treated as endogenously
determined but as exogenously given: V (c, C) = (1− θ)−1 [(c− κC)1−θ − 1]. In terms of the
pure relative consumption approach, the more general Liu and Turnovsky (2005) version (57)
corresponds to the following specification of the instantaneous utility function:9
u (c, c/C) =
1
1− θ

[
c
(
1− κ (c/C)−ϕ
1− κ
)1/ϕ]1−θ
− 1
 . (58)
It is easily verified that (58) is obtained by setting
ξ1 = 1, Q (c/C, a/A) =
(
1− κ (c/C)−ϕ
1− κ
)1/ϕ
in our own general representation of the instantaneous utility function given by (38). Taking into
account that ξ1 = 1, ε
Q,c/C (c/C, a/A) = κ (c/C)−ϕ /
[
1− κ (c/C)−ϕ], and εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A) =
0, it then follows from (41), (42), and (43) that εˆuc,c = −θ, mˆa/A = 0, ηˆ = 0,
mˆc/C =
κ
1− κ, σˆ =
1
θ
, gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ
θ
.
Obviously, the common growth rate gD depends neither on κ nor on ϕ, i.e., ∂gD/∂κ =
9The assumptions 0 < κ < 1 and 0 < 1 − ϕ < θ ensure that both u = u (c, c/C) and V = V (c, C) are
well-behaved in the sense that all assumptions made in (2) and (4), respectively, are satisfied (for a proof see
Appendix C.3).
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∂gD/∂ϕ = 0. Hence, in this specification, the standard approach does not run the risk of
making erroneous conclusions regardless of whether it uses ∂gD/∂κ or ∂gD/∂ϕ to assess the
implications of relative consumption preferences in the absence of the relative wealth motive.
The properties of gD result from the following facts: First, since ξ1 = 1 holds by assumption,
the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution, σˆ = 1/ |εˆuc,c| = 1/θ, is independent of
both κ and ϕ. Second, the positive dependence of mˆc/C = κ/ (1− κ) on κ is irrelevant for gD
because, due to the absence of the relative wealth motive, we have mˆa/A = 0 and, hence, the
comparison-induced extra return factor ηˆ is identical to zero, irrespective of the magnitude of
mˆc/C .
4.3 Specifications in which both relative consumption and relative wealth
matter for utility
In this subsection we consider three specifications in which both relative consumption and
relative wealth matter for utility.
Specification #4: Setting
ξ1 = 1, Q (c/C, a/A) = [Ω (c/C)]
γ [Ψ (a/A)]δ , (59)
in our general representation of the instantaneous utility function given by (38), where Ω (·)
and Ψ (·) denote functions, we obtain a specification that is equivalent to the utility function
used by Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2008) for the case of an exogenously given labor supply.
Our presentation differs only with respect to the notation. It is easily verified that εˆQ,c/C ≡
εQ,c/C (1, 1) = γεΩ,c/C (1) and εˆQ,a/A ≡ εQ,a/A (1, 1) = δεΨ,a/A (1), where εΩ,c/C (1) denotes the
elasticity of the function Ω with respect to c/C, evaluated at c/C = 1, while εΨ,a/A (1) denotes
the elasticity of the function Ψ with respect to a/A, evaluated at a/A = 1. Substituting these
two results and ξ1 = 1 into (41) and (43), we obtain
mˆc/C = γεΩ,c/C (1) , mˆa/A = δεΨ,a/A (1) , |εˆuc,c| = θ, (60)
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ δε
Ψ,a/A (1)
1 + γεΩ,c/C (1)
× f (1, L)
θ +
δεΨ,a/A (1)
1 + γεΩ,c/C (1)
. (61)
Employing a solution for gD that is equivalent to (61), Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2008) show
the following (see Proposition 1 given on p. 315): i) without the relative consumption motive
(γ = 0), growth increases in the strength of the relative wealth motive, ii) without the relative
wealth motive (δ = 0), economic growth remains unaffected by the strength of the relative
consumption motive, iii) if both relative consumption and relative wealth matter for utility, a
stronger relative consumption motive unambiguously harms economic growth.
These assertions coincide with the results of our fundamental factor approach summarized in
our own Proposition 4. The reason for this fact can be explained as follows: Since Tournemaine
and Tsoukis (2008) set ξ1 = 1 and, in addition, use the implicit assumption that the two
expressions γεΩ,c/C (1) and δεΨ,a/A (1) are independent of each other, there is a one-to-one
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correspondence between the three fundamental factors |εˆuc,c|, mˆc/C , and mˆa/A, and the three
parameters θ, γεΩ,c/C (1), and δεΨ,a/A (1). Changes in γεΩ,c/C (1) affect only the strength
of the relative consumption motive, while changes in δεΨ,a/A (1) alter solely the intensity of
the relative wealth motive. Hence, it is legitimate to assess the implications of the relative
consumption [resp. relative wealth] preferences by applying the standard approach, i.e., by
analyzing the dependence of gD on γεΩ,c/C (1) [resp. δεΨ,a/A (1)]. The following properties of
gD are easily verified: (a) ∂gD/∂
[
δεΨ,a/A (1)
]
> 0 holds regardless of whether γεΩ,c/C (1) = 0 or
γεΩ,c/C (1) > 0. (b) If δεΨ,a/A (1) = 0, then (61) simplifies to gD = (1/θ) [fk (1, L)− ρ] so that
gD is independent of γεΩ,c/C (1). (c) If δεΨ,a/A (1) > 0, then ∂gD/∂
[
γεΩ,c/C (1)
]
< 0. These
mathematical results confirm the results of Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2008).
While the specification used by Tournemaine and Tsoukis (2008) yields correct results,
it does not encompass specifications in which instantaneous utility depends on a geometric
weighted average of absolute consumption, relative consumption, and relative wealth. Hence, it
covers neither the specifications (54) and (55) that were used for the illustrations #1 and #2,
nor the two specifications that we analyze in the remainder of this subsection. In the following,
we assume that the instantaneous utility function is of the simple form given by (44). We
analyze two alternative cases in which ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3 = 1 holds in addition to ξ1 > 0, ξ2 > 0, and
ξ3 > 0.
Specification #5: We assume that the two exponents of relative consumption and relative
wealth, ξ2 > 0 and ξ3 > 0, are independent of each other and satisfy the condition that
ξ2 + ξ3 < 1. From the constraint ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3 = 1 it then follows that the exponent of absolute
consumption is automatically given by ξ1 = 1− ξ2 − ξ3 > 0 so that
u (c, c/C, a/A) =
1
1− θ
{[
c1−ξ2−ξ3 (c/C)ξ2 (a/A)ξ3
]1−θ − 1} . (62)
Substitution of ξ1 = 1− ξ2 − ξ3 into (47), (48), and (49) yields
mˆc/C =
ξ2
1− ξ2 − ξ3 , mˆ
a/A =
ξ3
1− ξ2 − ξ3 , |εˆ
uc,c| = 1 + (θ − 1) (1− ξ2 − ξ3)
σˆ =
1
1 + (θ − 1) (1− ξ2 − ξ3) , ηˆ =
ξ3
1− ξ3 ,
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ξ3
1− ξ3 f (1, L)
1 + (θ − 1) (1− ξ2 − ξ3) + ξ3
1− ξ3
. (63)
From Proposition 4 (see part ii) we know that if relative wealth matters for utility so that
mˆa/A > 0, then gD depends negatively on the strength of the relative consumption motive as
measured by the percentage-MRS mˆc/C . The standard analysis would question the validity
of this result (that coincides with an assertion made in Proposition 1 of Tournemaine and
Tsoukis (2008)) by using (63) and pointing out that i) ∂gD/∂ξ2 > 0 holds for θ > 1, and
ii) ∂gD/∂ξ2 = 0 holds for θ = 1. However, once again the criticism would be based on the
erroneous presumption that a change in ξ2 represents a ceteris paribus change in the strength of
the relative consumption motive. Our fundamental factor approach elucidates the main problem
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of the standard approach: Since changes in the exponent of relative consumption ξ2 affect the
two fundamental factors mˆc/C and mˆa/A, and, in addition, the third fundamental factor |εˆuc,c|
provided that θ 6= 1, the partial derivative ∂gD/∂ξ2 yields misleading information with respect
to the growth effects of relative consumption preferences. More precisely, under the specification
(62), any increase in the exponent of relative consumption ξ2 is necessarily associated with a fall
in the exponent of absolute consumption ξ1 = 1− ξ2 − ξ3 of equal magnitude, while ξ3 remains
unchanged. This fall in ξ1 reinforces the rise in the percentage-MRS of relative consumption
mˆc/C = ξ2/ξ1 due to the decrease in the denominator. In contrast to specifications #1 and #2,
the fall in ξ1 also leads to an increase in the percentage-MRS of relative wealth mˆ
a/A = ξ3/ξ1.
Hence, there is also an increase in the strength of the relative wealth motive. The increase in
mˆa/A causes the comparison-induced extra return factor ηˆ to rise, while the rise in mˆc/C exerts
a negative effect on ηˆ. Note that the two effects offset each other perfectly. This follows from
the fact that ηˆ = ξ3/ (1− ξ3) is independent of ξ2. Hence, although relative wealth matters for
utility, changes in ξ2 affect the decentralized growth rate g
D, if at all, only via the resulting
change in the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution, i.e., via the σˆ-channel. There is
no effect via the ηˆ-channel. The fall in ξ1 = 1− ξ2− ξ3 that results from an increase in ξ2 leads
to an ambiguous reaction of |εˆuc,c| and σˆ = 1/ |εˆuc,c|, where sgn(∂σˆ/∂ξ2) = −sgn(∂σˆ/∂ξ1) =
sgn(θ − 1). If θ > 1 holds, then the increase in ξ2 causes σˆ to rise. According to (29) the
rise in σˆ causes the decentralized growth rate gD to increase. Analogously, if θ < 1, then the
opposite results obtain. Finally, if θ = 1, then changes in ξ2 affect neither ηˆ nor σˆ so that g
D
is independent of ξ2.
Specification #6: Finally, we use a specification in which status is not only implicitly,
but also explicitly taken into account. More precisely, we assume that the instantaneous utility
function u can be written as u (c, c/C, a/A) ≡ u˜ (c, s (c/C, a/A)), where s stands for status. To
ensure that u (c, c/C, a/A) is of the simple form given by (44) and that ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3 = 1 holds,
we employ the following specifications of u˜ (c, s) and s (c/C, a/A):
u˜ (c, s) =
1
1− θ
[(
c1−βsβ
)1−θ − 1] , s (c/C, a/A) = (c/C)φ (a/A)1−φ , (64)
where θ > 0, 0 < β < 1, 1 + (θ − 1) (1− β) > 0, and 0 < φ < 1. The following properties of the
function u˜ (c, s) are easily verified:
ms (c, s) ≡ s
c
× u˜s (c, s)
u˜c (c, s)
=
β
1− β ≡ mˆ
s > 0, ∀ (c, s) ∈ Θu˜, (65)
εu˜c,c (c, s) ≡ cu˜cc (c, s)
u˜c (c, s)
= − [1 + (θ − 1) (1− β)] ≡ εˆu˜c,c < 0, ∀ (c, s) ∈ Θu˜, (66)
where Θu˜ denotes the domain of u˜ (c, s). Please note that m
s is the main innovation of the new
specification. It represents the percentage-MRS of status s for absolute consumption c. Hence,
ms is the appropriate measure of the intensity of the quest for overall status that is determined
by both relative consumption and relative wealth. The term εu˜c,c denotes the elasticity of the
marginal utility of absolute consumption u˜c (c, s) with respect to absolute consumption. The
status function s (c/C, a/A) exhibits the property that its elasticities with respect to relative
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consumption and relative wealth, respectively, are constant functions over its domain Θs so that
εs,c/C (c/C, a/A) = φ ≡ εˆs,c/C > 0, εs,a/A (c/C, a/A) = 1− φ ≡ εˆs,a/A > 0
hold for all (c/C, a/A) ∈ Θs. The specification
u (c, c/C, a/A) =
1
1− θ
{[
c1−β (c/C)βφ (a/A)β(1−φ)
]1−θ − 1} (67)
that results from (64) seems to be the natural extension of the pure relative consumption
specification #1 [see (54)] to the case in which also relative wealth matters. It is obvious from
(67) that
ξ1 = 1− β > 0, ξ2 = βφ > 0, ξ3 = β (1− φ) > 0 (68)
so that ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3 = 1. It is easily verified that
mˆc/C = mˆs × εˆs,c/C = β
1− β × φ > 0, mˆ
a/A = mˆs × εˆs,a/A = β
1− β × (1− φ) > 0. (69)
|εˆuc,c| = ∣∣εˆu˜c,c∣∣ = 1 + (θ − 1) (1− β) . (70)
The corresponding common growth rate gD is obtained by substituting (68) into (49). According
to (69), the percentage-MRS of x for absolute consumption c, mˆx, where x = c/C and a/A,
can be written as the product of the percentage-MRS of status s for absolute consumption c,
mˆs, and the elasticity of status s with respect to x, εˆs,x. Hence, variations in mˆs cause both
mˆc/C and mˆa/A to change, but leave the percentage-MRS of relative wealth a/A for relative
consumption c/C, ma/A/mc/C , unaffected. From (65), (66), (69), and (70) it is obvious that
the simplicity of the specification (67) entails two significant drawbacks with respect to the
application of the standard analysis: i) Since changes in the parameter φ affect both mˆc/C and
mˆa/A (via the changes in both εˆs,c/C and εˆs,a/A), the partial derivative ∂gD/∂φ is unsuited to
analyze the effects of ceteris paribus changes in the intensity of the relative consumption motive
or the relative wealth motive. ii) The partial derivative ∂gD/∂β is inappropriate to analyze the
effects of a change in the intensity of the quest for overall status. This is due to the following
fact: If θ 6= 1, then a change in β affects not only the willingness to substitute status for absolute
consumption as measured by mˆs, but also the willingness to substitute absolute consumption
intertemporally as determined by 1/
∣∣εˆu˜c,c∣∣ = 1/ |εˆuc,c|.
It can be shown that the standard analysis allows for correct results if i) the specification
(64) is replaced by
u˜ (c, s) =
1
1− θ
[
(cχ1sχ2)1−θ − 1
]
, s (c/C, a/A) = (c/C)φ1 (a/A)φ2 ,
and ii) any functional dependence between the parameters θ, χ1, χ2, φ1, and φ2 is ruled out by
assumption. For a thorough analysis of this alternative, more general specification see Appendix
C.4.
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5 The socially planned solution – General results and potential
fallacies of the standard analysis
It is well known that in the model with standard preferences i) the growth rate of the decen-
tralized economy is inefficiently low due to the knowledge spillovers and ii) the social optimum
can be replicated by optimally granting subsidies on capital or production. To avoid other
distortions, these subsidies have to be financed with a lump-sum tax [see, for instance, Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995), p. 146–152]. In the following we analyze how this result is modified
by the introduction of relative consumption and relative wealth preferences.
The benevolent social planner internalizes not only the knowledge spillovers in the produc-
tion sector but also the externalities that result from relative consumption and relative wealth
preferences. Since by assumption households are identical in every respect, the social planner
will assign identical consumption paths to the individual households so that c = C holds. This,
in turn, implies that the resulting time paths of individual wealth are also identical so that
a = A = K. Using these aspects, the optimization problem of the social planner can be reduced
to the following simple problem: Maximize overall utility of the representative household as
given by
∫∞
0 e
−ρtu (C, 1, 1) dt, subject to the economy’s resource constraint K˙ = f (1, L)K −C
and the initial condition K (0) = K0 by choosing the time path of aggregate (= average) con-
sumption C optimally. The current-value Hamiltonian of this optimization problem is given by
H = u (C, 1, 1)+µ [f (1, L)K − C], where the costate variable µ denotes the shadow price of cap-
ital. The necessary optimality conditions for an interior equilibrium, HC = 0 and µ˙ = ρµ−HK ,
can be written as
µ = uc (C, 1, 1) , (71)
µ˙ = − [f (1, L)− ρ]µ. (72)
If, in addition, the transversality condition given by
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtµK = 0 (73)
holds, then the necessary optimality conditions are also sufficient, where this property follows
from the fact that ucc < 0 holds by assumption. Taking the time derivative of the first-
order condition (71) and plugging the result into (72) yields the Euler equation of aggregate
consumption in the socially planned economy as
C˙
C
= σP (C) [f (1, L)− ρ] , σP (C) ≡ − 1
εuc,c (C, 1, 1)
, (74)
where σP (C) is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution in the socially planned economy (the
superscript “P” stands for “Planner”). Please note that neither the percentage-MRS of relative
consumption mc/C nor the percentage-MRS of relative wealth ma/A are present in the Euler
equation. Consequently, in the socially planned economy there is no counterpart ηP (C) to the
comparison-induced extra return factor ηD (C) that plays a crucial role in the decentralized
economy. For the results discussed below it is important that according to (24) the social
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marginal product of capital exceeds the private marginal product, f (1, L) > fk (1, L).
Since uc > 0 holds by assumption, it follows from (71) that µ (t) > 0 for t ≥ 0. Hence,
integration of (72) yields the result that the transversality condition (73) is equivalent to
lim
t→∞ e
−f(1,L)tK (t) = 0. (75)
Similar to the decentralized market economy, we restrict our attention to the case in which
the preferences exhibit the property that a BGP exists.
Proposition 6. (The socially optimal BGP – existence)
A) If the instantaneous utility function u = u (c, c/C, a/A) satisfies the conditions given in
(32) [Proposition 3],
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C , ma/A (C, 1, 1) = mˆa/A, εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c, ∀C > 0,
where mˆc/C ≥ 0, mˆa/A ≥ 0 (with max{mˆc/C , mˆa/A} > 0), and εˆuc,c < 0, then the
effective elasticities of intertemporal substitution in both the socially planned economy and
the decentralized economy are constant functions of C, where the corresponding constant
levels are identical:
σP (C) = σD (C) =
1
|εˆuc,c| ≡ σˆ ∀C > 0. (76)
If, in addition, the condition
max
{
(σˆ − 1) f (1, L)
σˆ
, 0
}
< ρ < f (1, L) (77)
is satisfied, then an economically meaningful BGP exists in the socially planned econ-
omy. Along the BGP, the constant common growth rate of consumption and capital
gP = (C˙/C)P = (K˙/K)P and the constant consumption-capital ratio (C/K)P are given
by
gP = σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ] > 0, (C/K)P = (1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ > 0. (78)
B) The model has no transitional dynamics.
For a proof of proposition 6 see Appendix D.1. Next, we compare the decentralized solution
with the socially planned one. The aggregate resource constraints are identical in the two
economies: K˙ = f (1, L)K −C. In contrast to this common differential equation for aggregate
capital, the Euler equations for aggregate consumption that are given by
C˙
C
= σˆ
[
fk (1, L) + ηˆ × C
K
− ρ
]
, and
C˙
C
= σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ] ,
differ. According to Proposition 6, assumption (32) implies that the effective elasticities of
intertemporal substitution of the decentralized and the socially planned economy are identical,
σP (C) = σD (C) = σˆ, ∀C > 0 [see (76)]. Hence, it is verified at first glance that the decen-
tralized growth rate gD deviates from its socially optimal counterpart gP if and only if the
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decentralized effective rate of return fk (1, L) + ηˆ × (C/K)D deviates from the social marginal
product of capital f (1, L). If the comparison-induced extra return factor equals zero, ηˆ = 0,
then the decentralized effective rate of return simplifies to the private marginal product of cap-
ital fk (1, L). Taking into account that fk (1, L) < f (1, L) [see (24)] holds because individual
firms do not internalize knowledge spillovers, we obtain that gD < gP holds for ηˆ = 0. Hence,
if relative wealth does not matter for utility so that mˆa/A = 0 and ηˆ = mˆa/A/
(
1 + mˆc/C
)
= 0,
then the growth rate in the decentralized economy is inefficiently low. In the following we an-
alyze the dependence of the socially optimal growth rate gP and the difference of the growth
rates gP − gD (henceforth, the growth rate gap) on ηˆ and σˆ and the two fundamental factors
mˆa/A and mˆc/C in detail.
In the following proposition and corollary we assume that i) the instantaneous utility function
u satisfies the conditions (32) given in Proposition 3, and ii) the subjective discount rate ρ
satisfies the conditions given by (26) and (77) so that in both the decentralized economy and
the socially planned economy an economically meaningful BGP exists.
Proposition 7. (The dependence of gP and gP − gD on ηˆ and σˆ)
i) The growth rate gap gP − gD decreases monotonically as the comparison-induced extra
return factor ηˆ increases, because the decentralized growth rate gD depends positively on
ηˆ, while the socially optimal growth rate gP is independent of ηˆ. There exists a threshold
ηˆcrit > 0 with the following properties: If 0 ≤ ηˆ < ηˆcrit, then gP − gD > 0, i.e., the
decentralized growth rate is inefficiently low. If ηˆ = ηˆcrit, then gP − gD = 0 and the
decentralized growth rate equals its socially optimal counterpart. Finally, if ηˆ > ηˆcrit, then
gP − gD < 0 so that decentralized growth is too high as compared to the social optimum.
∂gP
∂ηˆ
= 0,
∂
(
gP − gD)
∂ηˆ
= −∂g
D
∂ηˆ
< 0,
sgn
(
gP − gD) = sgn (ηˆcrit − ηˆ) , where ηˆcrit ≡ f (1, L)− fk (1, L)
(1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ > 0.
ii) An increase in the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution σˆ causes both gP and
gD to rise. A sufficient (but not necessary) condition for a positive dependence of gP −gD
on σˆ is that the decentralized growth rate is inefficiently low, gP > gD:
∂gP
∂σˆ
> 0,
∂gD
∂σˆ
> 0,
∂
(
gP − gD)
∂σˆ
=
1
σˆ
(
gP − g
D
1 + σˆηˆ
)
≥ 1
σˆ
(
gP − gD) .
For a proof of Proposition 7 see Appendix D.2. An important aspect of the proof of item
i) is the fact that the growth rate gap can be written in the form gP − gD = Λ × (ηˆcrit − ηˆ),
where Λ > 0. In the following corollary we address the dependence of gP and gP − gD on the
fundamental factors mˆa/A and mˆc/C .
Corollary 3. (The dependence of gP and gP − gD on mˆa/A and mˆc/C)
i) The gap gP − gD decreases monotonically as mˆa/A increases because the decentralized
growth rate gD depends positively on mˆa/A, while the socially optimal growth rate gP is
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independent of mˆa/A. There exists a threshold
(
mˆa/A
)crit
> 0 with the following proper-
ties: If 0 ≤ mˆa/A < (mˆa/A)crit, then gP − gD > 0, i.e., the decentralized growth rate is
inefficiently low. If mˆa/A =
(
mˆa/A
)crit
, then gP −gD = 0 and the decentralized growth rate
equals its socially optimal counterpart. Finally, if mˆa/A >
(
mˆa/A
)crit
, then gP − gD < 0
so that decentralized growth is too high as compared to the social optimum. The length
of the interval [0,
(
mˆa/A
)crit
), in which the decentralized growth rate is inefficiently low,
depends positively on mˆc/C .
∂gP
∂mˆa/A
= 0,
∂
(
gP − gD)
∂mˆa/A
= − ∂g
D
∂mˆa/A
< 0,
sgn
(
gP − gD) = sgn [(mˆa/A)crit − mˆa/A] ,
where
(
mˆa/A
)crit ≡ [f (1, L)− fk (1, L)] (1 + mˆc/C)
[1− (1/ |εˆuc,c|)] f (1, L) + (1/ |εˆuc,c|) ρ > 0.
ii) If relative wealth matters for utility so that mˆa/A > 0, then gP − gD depends positively on
mˆc/C because a rise in mˆc/C causes gD to decrease, while gP remains unchanged. However,
if mˆa/A = 0, i.e., in the absence of the relative wealth motive, gP − gD is independent of
mˆc/C , since changes in mˆc/C affect neither gP nor gD.
∂gP
∂mˆc/C
= 0, sgn
[
∂
(
gP − gD)
∂mˆc/C
]
= −sgn
(
∂gD
∂mˆc/C
)
= sgn
(
mˆa/A
)
.
The mathematical results given in Corollary 3 are easily obtained by 1) using the fact
that ηˆ = mˆa/A/
(
1 + mˆc/C
)
and σˆ = 1/ |εˆuc,c|, 2) taking into account that ∂gP /∂ηˆ = 0 holds
according to Proposition 7, and 3) recalling that ∂gD/∂mˆa/A > 0 and sgn
(
∂gD/∂mˆc/C
)
=
−sgn(mˆa/A) hold according to Proposition 4. The positive dependence of (mˆa/A)crit on mˆc/C
is verified at first glance. All other statements made in Corollary 3 follow directly from the
mathematical assertions.
These results make clear that neither relative consumption preferences nor relative wealth
preferences affect the socially optimal growth rate gP . In addition, if relative wealth is irrelevant
for utility, then the decentralized growth rate gD i) is lower than its socially optimal counterpart
due to the capital externality in the production function, gD < gP , and ii) is independent of the
strength of the relative consumption motive that is correctly measured by the percentage-MRS
mˆc/C . Hence, in the absence of relative wealth preferences, the gap gP − gD is independent
of mˆc/C , too. Users of the standard approach who employ the specification #1 given by (54),
u (c, c/C) = (1− θ)−1 {[c1−β (c/C)β]1−θ − 1}, and misinterpret the parameter β as the correct
measure of the strength of the relative consumption motive might question our assertions by
using the following results: The parameter setting ξ2 = β, ξ1 = 1 − ξ2 = 1 − β, and ξ3 = 0
implies that σˆ = [1 + (θ − 1) ξ1]−1 = [1 + (θ − 1) (1− β)]−1 and
gP =
f (1, L)− ρ
1 + (θ − 1) (1− β) , g
D =
fk (1, L)− ρ
1 + (θ − 1) (1− β) ,
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gP − gD > 0, ∂
(
gP − gD)
∂β
=
(θ − 1) [f (1, L)− fk (1, L)]
[1 + (θ − 1) (1− β)]2 .
It is obvious that sgn[∂
(
gP − gD) /∂β] = sgn(∂σˆ/∂β) = sgn(θ − 1). If θ > 1, then a rise in β
causes both gD and gP to increase, where the rise in gP exceeds that of gD so that gP − gD
increases. Analogously, if θ < 1, then a rise in β causes both gD and gP to decrease, where the
fall in gP exceeds that of gD so that the gap gP − gD decreases but remains strictly positive.
From our analysis it is obvious that these reactions result exclusively from the change in the
exponent of absolute consumption, ξ1 = 1 − β, and the associated change in σˆ. By contrast,
the change in the exponent of relative consumption, ξ2 = β, affects neither g
D nor gP . In other
words, changes in β cause gD, gP , and gP − gD to react because the change in ξ1 = 1 − β
alters the common effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution, σD = σP = σˆ, and hence
the willingness of the representative household to substitute absolute consumption over time
in both the decentralized and the socially planned economy. By contrast, the strength of the
relative consumption motive does not play any role.
Our result that the socially optimal growth rate gP is independent of both relative consump-
tion and relative wealth preferences might be also questioned erroneously by using the standard
approach and employing specifications #3, #5, and #6. Our fundamental factor approach
shows, however, that also in these instances changes in the parameters that seem to measure
the strength of the relative consumption motive and/or the relative wealth motive actually
affect gP only via the associated change in the exponent of absolute consumption ξ1 and the
resulting reaction of the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution, σP = σˆ.
6 Conclusions
We use a novel approach for analyzing the effects of relative consumption and relative wealth
preferences in the context of an otherwise standard AK-model with homogeneous agents and
exogenous labor supply. We put special emphasis on the identification of the fundamental
factors that ultimately determine both the decentralized and the socially optimal long-run
growth rates. Our approach allows to analyze separately the effects of changes in i) the strength
of the relative consumption motive, ii) the strength of the relative wealth motive, and iii)
households’ willingness to substitute absolute consumption intertemporally on the long-run
growth rate by considering ceteris paribus changes in the corresponding fundamental factor.
We show that there are specifications of the instantaneous utility function in which such ceteris
paribus thought experiments cannot be carried out in the context of the standard approach that
does not identify the fundamental factors. Instead, the standard approach restricts attention
to the dependence of the growth rate on the parameters of the instantaneous utility function
that seem to determine the strength of the relative consumption and relative wealth motives.
Using our fundamental factor approach, we show that in a widely used type of utility function
a parameter that seems to affect only the strength of the relative consumption motive actually
also influences both the strength of the relative wealth motive and the willingness to substitute
absolute consumption intertemporally. Since the standard approach is unaware of the latter
two effects, it attributes the total growth effect that results from a change in this parameter
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erroneously to the change in the strength of the relative consumption motive. It is thus possible
that the resulting assertions of the standard approach with respect to the implications of relative
consumption preferences on long-run growth are not only quantitatively, but also qualitatively
flawed. These erroneous conclusions apply to both the decentralized and the socially planned
economy. We also provide specifications of the utility function in which the standard analysis
yields correct results.
To obtain correct results and to explain the pitfalls of the standard analysis, we draw heavily
on the Euler equation for aggregate consumption. The introduction of relative consumption and
relative wealth preferences affects the Euler equation of the decentralized economy by modifying
the elasticity of intertemporal substitution and the rate of return of wealth accumulation. In
principle, the effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution may depend on the strength of
the relative consumption motive. This possibility vanishes, however, in case that we introduce
weak restrictions on the utility function that are sufficient for the existence of a balanced growth
path (BGP). Consequently, in the presence of these restrictions all effects can be explained by
means of the effective rate of return that is defined as the sum of the market rate of return and
an extra return that results from social comparisons based on both relative wealth and relative
consumption. The assumption that labor supply is exogenously given implies that relative
consumption and relative wealth preferences do not affect the market rate of return. Hence,
these preferences influence the long-run growth rate only via their effect on the comparison-
induced extra return (CIER). Using this fact we derive the following results: i) The CIER
depends positively on the strength of the relative wealth motive, irrespective of the strength of
the relative consumption motive. Consequently, the willingness to save and the implied BGP
growth rate always depend positively on the strength of the relative wealth motive. ii) If relative
wealth matters for utility, then a rise in the strength of the relative consumption motive causes
the CIER to fall. In this situation the willingness to save decreases because the fall in relative
consumption that is associated with a reduction in absolute consumption now leads to a greater
decrease in instantaneous utility. Consequently, in the presence of relative wealth preferences
the growth rate depends negatively on the strength of the relative consumption motive. iii) In
the absence of the relative wealth motive the CIER is equal to zero irrespective of the strength
of the relative consumption motive. Thus, in this case the strength of the relative consumption
motive does not affect long-run growth.
We also show that iv) neither relative consumption nor relative wealth preferences affect
the socially planned solution. Using the results given by i) – iv) we finally derive the following
insights: v) In the absence of the relative wealth motive, the decentralized growth rate is ineffi-
ciently low, with the positive gap between the socially optimal growth rate and its decentralized
counterpart being unaffected by the strength of the relative consumption motive. vi) If relative
wealth matters for utility, then a rise in the strength of the relative consumption motive causes
the growth rate gap to increase. The growth rate gap decreases, however, as the strength of the
relative wealth motive increases. There is a critical level of the strength of the relative wealth
motive such that the decentralized growth rate equals the socially optimal one. We give several
illustrations in which the standard analysis might yield the erroneous conclusion that our results
given in iii), iv), and v) are not robust with respect to the specification of the instantaneous
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utility function.
With respect to further research, we identify the following promising areas. Since the erro-
neous conclusions of the standard analysis are usually drawn in models with exogenous labor
supply, we restricted our analysis to this case. This assumption simplified the presentation sig-
nificantly because it has the additional advantage that the BGP growth rates can be calculated
explicitly. Endogenizing the labor supply decision would lead to additional insights because it
allows for the possibility that relative consumption and relative wealth preferences affect not
only the comparison-induced extra return, but also the market rate of return. In this setting
it would be particularly interesting to analyze the growth effects within a Romer (1990) frame-
work in which technological progress is driven by purposeful R&D investments, which, in turn
require labor in the form of scientists to produce new blueprints. Another interesting exten-
sion is to apply the fundamental factor approach to a framework with heterogeneous agents
that, in addition, also allows for alternative assumptions with respect to the reference levels of
consumption and wealth on which the comparisons of the agents are based.
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Appendix
A The model (Section 2)
A.1 The expressions for Vcc and VccVaa − (Vca)2
The definition V (c, C, a,A) ≡ u (c, c/C, a/A) given in (3) implies that
Vcc = ucc + 2C
−1uc(c/C) + C−2u(c/C)(c/C) (A.1)
VccVaa − (Vca)2 = A−2
[
ucc + 2C
−1uc(c/C) + C−2u(c/C)(c/C)
]
u(a/A)(a/A)
−A−2 [uc(a/A) + C−1u(c/C)(a/A)]2 (A.2)
Proof : The validity of (A.1) and (A.2) is easily verified by using the following results:
Vc = uc + C
−1uc/C ,
Vcc = ucc + 2C
−1uc(c/C) + C−2u(c/C)(c/C),
Vca = A
−1 [uc(a/A) + C−1u(c/C)(a/A)] ,
Va = A
−1u(a/A),
Vaa = A
−2u(a/A)(a/A). 
A.2 Properties of the production function
By assumption each firm i ∈ [0, 1] employs the same technology so that yi = f (ki, Bli) for
i ∈ [0, 1]. Since by assumption the common production function f exhibits constant returns to
scale the following equations hold for i ∈ [0, 1] (all results are well-known from intermediary
microeconomics):
yi = f (ki, Bli) = kif (1, Bli/ki) , (A.3)
fk (ki, Bli) = fk (1, Bli/ki) , f(Bl) (ki, Bli) = f(Bl) (1, Bli/ki) , (A.4)
f (ki, Bli) = fk (ki, Bli) ki + f(Bl) (ki, Bli)Bli. (A.5)
The equations given in (A.4) follow from the fact that the marginal products of capital fk and
effective labor labor f(Bl) are homogeneous of degree zero. Equation (A.5) results from the
Euler theorem.
Real profits of firm i ∈ [0, 1] denoted by pii are given by pii = f (ki, Bli)− rki − wli. It can
be verified at first glance that the necessary optimality conditions are given by
r = fk (ki, Bli) , w = f(Bl) (ki, Bli)B, i ∈ [0, 1] . (A.6)
From (A.6) it is obvious that the first-order conditions of the representative firm can be written
in the form given by (14):
r = fk (k,Bl) , w = f(Bl) (k,Bl)B.
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B The decentralized solution – Part I (Section 3)
B.1 Derivation of (15)
Using (A.4) and taking into account that by assumption B = K holds, the necessary optimality
conditions (A.6),
r = fk (ki, Bli) , w = f(Bl) (ki, Bli)B, i ∈ [0, 1] ,
can be rewritten as
r = fk (1,Kli/ki) , w = f(Bl) (1,Kli/ki)K, i ∈ [0, 1] . (B.1)
The equations given in (B.1) imply that in a macroeconomic equilibrium each firm will choose
the same capital-labor ratio.10 It is easily verified that
ki/li = K/L, i ∈ [0, 1] , (B.2)
where K and L denote both the aggregate and the average values of capital and labor input,
respectively. Substituting (B.2) into (B.1) we obtain the two equations given in (15):
r = fk (1, L) , w = f(Bl) (1, L)K. 
B.2 Derivation of (17)
Substitution of B = K and (B.2) into (A.3) yields yi = kif (1, L), for i ∈ [0, 1]. This, in turn,
implies that aggregate output Y in a macroeconomic equilibrium is given by
Y = f (1, L)K. (B.3)
Using the Euler theorem (A.5) and the necessary optimality conditions (A.6) we obtain yi =
rki +wli. Since the adding-up theorem holds at the level of the individual firm, it holds at the
aggregate level, too:
Y = rK + wL. (B.4)
Combining (B.3) and (B.4) we obtain
rK + wL = Y = f (1, L)K. (B.5)
Substitution of (16), i.e., c = C, a = A = K, and l = L into the flow budget constraint (1),
a˙ = ra+ wl − c, yields
K˙ = rK + wL− C. (B.6)
10In contrast to the common capital labor ratio, firms need not necessarily choose identical levels of capital
input and labor input [see, for instance, the thorough analysis in Sargent (1987), pp. 7–10].
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From (B.5) and (B.6) it then follows that
K˙ = Y − C = f (1, L)K − C. (B.7)
Dividing both sides of (B.7) by K, we obtain (17):
K˙/K = f (1, L)− C/K. 
B.3 Derivation of (24)
Using (A.3)–(A.5), the following equation is easily derived:
f (1, Bli/ki) = fk (1, Bli/ki) + f(Bl) (1, Bli/ki) (Bli/ki) . (B.8)
Substitution of (B.2) and B = K into (B.8) yields
f (1, L) = fk (1, L) + f(Bl) (1, L)L.
Taking into account that f(Bl) > 0, we obtain (24):
f (1, L) > fk (1, L) . 
B.4 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof of A) Assumption (25),
σD (C) = σˆ, ηD (C) = ηˆ, ∀C > 0, (B.9)
where σˆ > 0 and ηˆ ≥ 0 are constants, implies that the Euler equation for aggregate consumption
(20) simplifies to
C˙/C = σˆ [fk (1, L) + ηˆ × (C/K)− ρ] . (B.10)
The differential equation for aggregate capital given by (17) is unaffected by the assumptions
made in (25) [= (B.9)]. It is still given by
K˙/K = f (1, L)− (C/K) . (B.11)
Taking into account that, by assumption, L is exogenously given and constant over time and
that both σˆ and ηˆ are constants, it is obvious from (B.10) and (B.11) that there exists a balanced
growth path (BGP) in which C and K grow at the same constant rate so that C/K remains
unchanged over time. The steady-state value of the common growth rate of aggregate consump-
tion and aggregate physical capital denoted by gD = (C˙/C)D = (K˙/K)D and the steady value
of the consumption-capital ratio denoted by (C/K)D are determined by the following system
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of equations:
gD = σˆ
[
fk (1, L) + ηˆ × (C/K)D − ρ
]
,
gD = f (1, L)− (C/K)D.
Solving this system of two equations for gD and (C/K)D, we obtain
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
, (B.12)
(C/K)D =
(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
. (B.13)
From (B.12) it is obvious that
gD > 0⇔ ρ < fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L) ≡ ρg. (B.14)
From (B.13) it follows that
(C/K)D > 0⇔ ρ > fk (1, L)− (1/σˆ) f (1, L) ≡ ρC/K . (B.15)
Since, by assumption, ηD (C) = ηˆ ≥ 0 holds for ∀C > 0, the transversality condition (23)
simplifies to
lim
t→∞ exp
{
−
∫ t
0
[
fk (1, L) + ηˆ × C (v)
K (v)
]
dv
}
K (t) = 0.
Along the BGP we have C/K = (C/K)D and K˙/K = gD at any point in time. Hence, the
transversality condition requires that −[fk (1, L) + ηˆ × (C/K)D] + gD < 0. Using the fact that
−
[
fk (1, L) + ηˆ × (C/K)D
]
+ gD = − [(1/σˆ)− 1] [fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L)] + (1 + ηˆ) ρ
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
,
we obtain
−
[
fk (1, L) + ηˆ × (C/K)D
]
+ gD < 0⇔ ρ > [1− (1/σˆ)] [fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L)]
1 + ηˆ
≡ ρTC , (B.16)
where the superscript “TC” stands for “transversality condition”.
From (B.14) it is obvious that ρg > 0. By contrast, both ρC/K and ρTC [see (B.15) and
(B.16)] may be of either sign. It is easily verified that
ρTC − ρC/K = [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ] [f (1, L)− fk (1, L)]
1 + ηˆ
.
Taking into account that f (1, L) > fk (1, L) [see (24)] it is clear that ρ
C/K < ρTC . Moreover,
we have
ρg − ρTC = [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ] [fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L)]
1 + ηˆ
> 0.
These results imply that ρC/K < ρTC < ρg holds. Hence, if the condition ρTC < ρ < ρg
is satisfied (so that also ρC/K < ρ holds), then the solutions given by (B.12) and (B.13) are
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economically meaningful in the sense that 1) the common growth rate gD is strictly positive (due
to ρ < ρg), 2) the consumption-capital ratio (C/K)D is strictly positive (due to ρ > ρC/K), and
3) the transversality condition (23) is satisfied (due to ρ > ρTC). By assumption, ρ is strictly
positive. Hence, the condition ρTC < ρ < ρg is satisfied if and only if either ρTC < 0 < ρ < ρg
or 0 < ρTC < ρ < ρg holds. These two conditions can be represented jointly in the following
compact way:
max{ρTC , 0} < ρ < ρg. (B.17)
Substituting the definitions of ρTC and ρg given in (B.14) and (B.16) into (B.17) yields
max
{
[1− (1/σˆ)] [fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L)]
1 + ηˆ
, 0
}
< ρ < fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L) . (B.18)
Obviously, the condition (B.18) is identical to the condition (26) given in Proposition 1.
Above we have shown that if (B.18) [= (26)] holds, then gD > 0 and (C/K)D > 0. Com-
bining these two results with (B.12) and (B.13), we obtain
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
> 0, (B.19)
(C/K)D =
(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
> 0. (B.20)
The representations (B.19) and (B.20) are identical to the representations (27) and (28) given
in Proposition 1. 
Proof of B) Finally, we show that if the condition (25) [= (B.9)] is satisfied, then the model
has no transitional dynamics. Let Z ≡ C/K. Since K is a state variable and C is a control
variable, Z = C/K is a control-like variable (this notion is used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995) on p. 162). In contrast to K, both C and Z = C/K can jump at any point in time.
From (B.10), (B.11), and C/K = Z it then follows that
C˙/C = σˆ [fk (1, L) + ηˆ × Z − ρ] , (B.21)
K˙/K = f (1, L)− Z, (B.22)
which, in turn implies that
Z˙ = [(C˙/C)− (K˙/K)]Z
= −{f (1, L)− σˆ [fk (1, L)− ρ]− (1 + σˆηˆ)Z}Z ≡ Φ (Z) .
Solving Z˙ = Φ (Z) = 0 for Z, we obtain {Z = 0} and {Z = ZD}, where
ZD =
(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
. (B.23)
Obviously, ZD given by (B.23) is identical to (C/K)D given by (B.13) [= (28)]. If (B.18) [=
(26)] holds, then ZD = (C/K)D > 0, so that ZD is the economically meaningful steady state
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value of the consumption-capital ratio. From
Φ′ (Z) = (1 + σˆηˆ)Z − {f (1, L)− σˆ [fk (1, L)− ρ]− (1 + σˆηˆ)Z}
and (B.23) it follows that
Φ′
(
ZD
)
= (1 + σˆηˆ)ZD > 0,
because the expression between curly brackets vanishes. Φ′
(
ZD
)
> 0 implies that the econom-
ically meaningful steady state of the differential equation Z˙ = Φ (Z) is unstable. Hence, the
equilibrium path of Z has no transitional dynamics, i.e., Z (t) = ZD for t ≥ 0. The initial value
of the jump variable Z has to be chosen in such a way that Z (0) = ZD. From Z = C/K and
ZD = (C/K)D it then follows that the initial value of the jump variable C has to be chosen
according to C (0) = (C/K)D × K0, where (C/K)D is given by (B.13) [= (28)] and K0 is
exogenously given.
Since Z (t) = ZD holds for t ≥ 0, it then follows from (B.21), (B.22), and (B.19) that
C˙/C = σˆ [fk (1, L) + ηˆ × Z − ρ] = fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
= gD > 0,
K˙/K = f (1, L)− Z = fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
= gD > 0
hold for t ≥ 0. The growth rates of consumption and capital are constant over time, identical
and equal to gD. Consequently, the growth rates of C and K have no transitional dynamics. 
B.5 Proof of Proposition 2
We restrict our attention to a proof of the mathematical results presented in (29) and (30). Along
the economically meaningful BGP the common growth rate of consumption and capital gD =
(C˙/C)D = (K˙/K)D and the consumption-capital ratio (C/K)D have the following properties
[see Proposition 1, (27) and (28)]:
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
> 0,
(C/K)D =
(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
> 0.
Taking partial derivatives of gD, (C/K)D, and
ηˆ × (C/K)D = ηˆ {(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]}
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
with respect to σˆ and ηˆ we obtain
∂gD
∂σˆ
=
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
σˆ2 [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]2
=
gD
σˆ2 [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]
, (B.24)
∂gD
∂ηˆ
=
(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]
[(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]2
=
(C/K)D
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
, (B.25)
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∂(C/K)D
∂σˆ
= −fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
σˆ2 [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]2
= − g
D
σˆ2 [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]
,
∂(C/K)D
∂ηˆ
= −(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]
[(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]2
= − (C/K)
D
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
,
∂
[
ηˆ × (C/K)D]
∂σˆ
= − ηˆ [fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)]
σˆ2 [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]2
= − ηˆg
D
σˆ2 [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]
,
∂
[
ηˆ × (C/K)D]
∂ηˆ
=
(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]
σˆ [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]2
=
(C/K)D
σˆ [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]
.
Using these results and taking into account that σˆ > 0 and ηˆ ≥ 0, we finally obtain (29) and
(30):
∂gD
∂σˆ
> 0,
∂(C/K)D
∂σˆ
< 0, sgn
(
∂
[
ηˆ × (C/K)D]
∂σˆ
)
= −sgn (ηˆ) ,
∂gD
∂ηˆ
> 0,
∂(C/K)D
∂ηˆ
< 0,
∂
[
ηˆ × (C/K)D]
∂ηˆ
> 0. 
B.6 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of (33) In (32) we make the following assumptions:
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C , ma/A (C, 1, 1) = mˆa/A, εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c, ∀C > 0,
where mˆc/C ≥ 0, mˆa/A ≥ 0 (with max{mˆc/C , mˆa/A} > 0), and εˆuc,c < 0 are constants. From
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C , ∀C > 0, it then follows that εmc/C ,c (C, 1, 1) = 0, ∀C > 0. Substituting
the latter result and the assumptions made in (32) into the definitions of σD (C) and ηD (C)
given by (21) and (22),
σD (C) ≡ −
[
εuc,c (C, 1, 1) +
mc/C (C, 1, 1)
1 +mc/C (C, 1, 1)
× εmc/C ,c (C, 1, 1)
]−1
,
ηD (C) ≡ m
a/A (C, 1, 1)
1 +mc/C (C, 1, 1)
,
we obtain (33),
σD (C) =
1
|εˆuc,c| ≡ σˆ, η
D (C) =
mˆa/A
1 + mˆc/C
≡ ηˆ, ∀C > 0. 
Proof of (34) From Proposition 1 we know that if these results for σˆ and ηˆ satisfy condition
(26),
max
{
[1− (1/σˆ)] [fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L)]
1 + ηˆ
, 0
}
< ρ < fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L) ,
then an economically meaningful decentralized BGP exists. In order to calculate the corre-
sponding BGP growth we substitute the expressions for σˆ and ηˆ into Equation (27) given in
42
Proposition 1,
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
.
In doing so we finally obtain (34):
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ mˆ
a/A
1 + mˆc/C
× f (1, L)
|εˆuc,c|+ mˆ
a/A
1 + mˆc/C
. 
B.7 An extended version of Proposition 5
Proposition 8. (Extended version of Proposition 5)
Let the instantaneous utility function u result from the transformation T of a multiplicatively
separable function v,
u (c, c/C, a/A) = T [v (c, c/C, a/A)] , v (c, c/C, a/A) = P (c)Q (c/C, a/A) . (B.26)
A) i) If the functions T (v), P (c), and Q (c/C, a/A) satisfy the conditions
T ′ > 0, T ′′ < 0, P > 0, P ′ > 0, P ′′ ≤ 0, (B.27)
Q > 0, Qc/C ≥ 0, Qa/A ≥ 0, Qc/C > 0 ∨Qa/A > 0, (B.28)
over their corresponding domains, then the instantaneous utility function (B.26) is well-
behaved in the sense that all assumptions made in (2) are satisfied, i.e., uc > 0, ucc < 0,
uc/C ≥ 0, ua/A ≥ 0, and uc/C > 0 ∨ ua/A > 0.
ii) The instantaneous utility function (B.26) is still well-behaved if in (B.27) the assump-
tion P ′′ ≤ 0 is replaced by a weaker assumption that does not rule out that P ′′ > 0 holds,
namely
εT
′,v (P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)) εP,c (c) + εP
′,c (c) < 0, (B.29)
where εP,c (c) ≡ P ′ (c)×[P (c)]−1 c and εP ′,c (c) ≡ P ′′ (c)×[P ′ (c)]−1 c denote the elasticities
of P (c) and P ′ (c), respectively, with respect to c, while εT ′,v (v) ≡ T ′′(v) × [T ′ (v)]−1 v
represents the elasticity of T ′ (v) with respect to v. Consequently, εT ′,v (P (c)Q (c/C, a/A))
gives the value that εT
′,v (v) takes at v = P (c)Q (c/C, a/A).
iii) The assumptions P > 0 and Q > 0 ensure that v > 0 so that transformations T that
are not defined for v < 0, such as functions of the CRRA-type, are not ruled out from the
outset.
B) The instantaneous utility function (B.26), u (c, c/C, a/A) = T [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)], ex-
hibits the property that
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C , ma/A (C, 1, 1) = mˆa/A, ηD (C) = ηˆ, ∀C > 0, (B.30)
where mˆc/C , mˆa/A, and ηˆ are constants, holds if and only if the function P (c) has the
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form
P (c) = ξ0c
ξ1 , for c > 0. (B.31)
In order to ensure that P (c) > 0 and P ′ (c) > 0 hold as required by the sufficient conditions
for the well-behavedness of the instantaneous utility function (B.26) given in A) it is
assumed that
ξ0 > 0, ξ1 > 0. (B.32)
C) The instantaneous utility function
u (c, c/C, a/A) = T
[
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
]
, ξ0 > 0, ξ1 > 0 (B.33)
that is obtained by substituting (B.31) into (B.26) and taking into account (B.32), has the
property that
εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c, σD (C) = σˆ, ∀C > 0, (B.34)
where εˆuc,c and σˆ are constants, holds if and only if the function T (v) has the form
T (v) = κ0 + κ1
v1−θ − 1
1− θ , for v > 0. (B.35)
In order to ensure that T ′ (v) > 0 and T ′′ (v) < 0 hold as required by (B.27), and that also
the condition (B.29) is satisfied, it is assumed that
κ1 > 0, θ > 0, 1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 > 0 (B.36)
hold in addition to (B.32).
D) The instantaneous utility function that is obtained by substituting (B.31) and (B.35) into
(B.26), and taking into account (B.28), (B.32), and (B.36),
u (c, c/C, a/A) = κ0 +
κ1
1− θ
{[
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
]1−θ − 1} , (B.37)
where the parameters satisfy the conditions
κ1 > 0, θ > 0, ξ0 > 0, ξ1 > 0, 1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 > 0, (B.38)
and the function Q (c/C, a/A) satisfies the conditions given (B.28), has the following prop-
erties:
i) It is well-behaved in the sense that all assumptions made in (2) are satisfied.
ii) The corresponding alternative representation, V (c, C, a,A) ≡ u (c, c/C, a/A), is well-
behaved in the sense that all assumptions made in (4), i.e., Vcc < 0, and VccVaa−(Vca)2 > 0
if ua/A > 0, are satisfied, if, in addition to (B.28) and (B.38), the conditions
0 < [1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] ξ1 + εQ,c/C
[
2 (θ − 1) ξ1 + θεQ,c/C − εQc/C ,c/C
]
, (B.39)
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0 <
{
[1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] ξ1 + εQ,c/C
[
2 (θ − 1) ξ1 + θεQ,c/C − εQc/C ,c/C
]}
×
×εQ,a/A
(
θεQ,a/A − εQa/A,a/A
)
−
{[
(1− θ) ξ1 − θεQ,c/C
]
εQ,a/A + εQ,c/CεQc/C ,a/A
}2
(B.40)
are satisfied, where (B.40) is only relevant in case that relative wealth matters for utility
so that Qa/A > 0. In (B.39) and (B.40) the following notation is used: The expres-
sions εQ,c/C ≡ Qc/C × (c/C)Q−1 and εQ,a/A ≡ Qa/A × (a/A)Q−1 denote the elasticities
of the function Q (c/C, a/A) with respect to c/C and a/A, the expressions εQc/C ,c/C ≡
Q(c/C)(c/C)×(c/C)
(
Qc/C
)−1
and εQc/C ,a/A ≡ Q(c/C)(a/A)×(a/A)
(
Qc/C
)−1
are the elastic-
ities of Qc/C with respect to c/C and a/A, while ε
Qa/A,a/A ≡ Q(a/A)(a/A)× (a/A)
(
Qa/A
)−1
denotes the elasticity of Qa/A with respect to a/A.
iii) The conditions given by (32) in Proposition 3 are satisfied, since mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C ,
ma/A (C, 1, 1) = mˆa/A, and εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c holds for C > 0, where
mˆc/C ≡ εˆ
Q,c/C
ξ1
≥ 0, mˆa/A ≡ εˆ
Q,a/A
ξ1
≥ 0, εˆuc,c ≡ − [1 + (θ − 1) ξ1] < 0. (B.41)
In (B.41) the constants εˆQ,c/C and εˆQ,a/A denote the values that the elasticities of the func-
tion Q (c/C, a/A) with respect to c/C and a/A, εQ,c/C (c/C, a/A), and εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A),
take in symmetric situations, i.e., at (c/C, a/A) = (1, 1):
εˆQ,c/C ≡ εQ,c/C (1, 1) , εˆQ,a/A ≡ εQ,a/A (1, 1) . (B.42)
iv) The conditions given in (25) in Proposition 1 are satisfied, because σD (C) = σˆ and
ηD (C) = ηˆ hold for C > 0, where
σˆ ≡ 1
1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 > 0, ηˆ ≡
εˆQ,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
≥ 0. (B.43)
If these constants σˆ and ηˆ satisfy the condition (26),
max
{
[1− (1/σˆ)] [fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L)]
1 + ηˆ
, 0
}
< ρ < fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L) ,
then according to Proposition 1 an economically meaningful decentralized BGP exists. The
corresponding constant common growth rate is given by
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ εˆ
Q,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
× f (1, L)
1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 + εˆ
Q,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
. (B.44)
v) The results for mˆc/C , mˆa/A, εˆuc,c, σˆ, and ηˆ given in (B.41), (B.43), and (B.44) are
independent of the parameters κ0, κ1, and ξ0. The well-behavedness of u (c, c/C, a/A)
given by (B.37) and its alternative representation V (c, C, a,A) ≡ u (c, c/C, a/A) depends
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on the signs of ξ0 and κ1 [i.e., ξ0 > 0 and κ1 > 0 has to hold according to (B.32) and
(B.36)], but not on the magnitudes of these two parameters. Hence, we can set, without
loss of generality, κ0 = 0, κ1 = 1, and ξ0 = 1, and employ the following representation of
the utility function:
u (c, c/C, a/A) =
1
1− θ
{[
cξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
]1−θ − 1} . (B.45)
Proof
Preliminaries
The specification of the instantaneous utility function u = u (c, c/C, a/A) given by (B.26),
u (c, c/C, a/A) = T [v (c, c/C, a/A)] , v (c, c/C, a/A) = P (c)Q (c/C, a/A) ,
implies that
uc (c, c/C, a/A) = T
′ [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]P ′ (c)Q (c/C, a/A) , (B.46)
uc/C (c, c/C, a/A) = T
′ [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]P (c)Qc/C (c/C, a/A) , (B.47)
ua/A (c, c/C, a/A) = T
′ [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]P (c)Qa/A (c/C, a/A) , (B.48)
ucc (c, c/C, a/A) = T
′′ [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]
[
P ′ (c)Q (c/C, a/A)
]2
+T ′ [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]P ′′ (c)Q (c/C, a/A) . (B.49)
Equations (B.46)–(B.49) can be rewritten as
uc (c, c/C, a/A) = c
−1 [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]T ′ [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)] εP,c (c) , (B.50)
uc/C (c, c/C, a/A) = (c/C)
−1 [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]T ′ [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]×
× εQ,c/C (c/C, a/A) , (B.51)
ua/A (c, c/C, a/A) = (a/A)
−1 P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)T ′ [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]×
× εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A) , (B.52)
ucc (c, c/C, a/A) = c
−1P ′ (c)Q (c/C, a/A)T ′ [P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)]×
×
{
εT
′,v (P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)) εP,c (c) + εP
′,c (c)
}
, (B.53)
where
εP,c (c) ≡ P ′ (c)× [P (c)]−1 c, (B.54)
εQ,c/C (c/C, a/A) ≡ Qc/C (c/C, a/A)× [Q (c/C, a/A)]−1 (c/C) , (B.55)
εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A) ≡ Qa/A (c/C, a/A)× [Q (c/C, a/A)]−1 (a/A) , (B.56)
εT
′,v (v) ≡ T ′′(v)× [T ′ (v)]−1 v, (B.57)
εP
′,c (c) ≡ P ′′ (c)× [P ′ (c)]−1 c. (B.58)
Here, εP,c (c) and εP
′,c (c) denote the elasticities of P (c) and P ′ (c), respectively, with respect to
c, while εQ,c/C (c/C, a/A) and εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A) are the elasticities of the function Q (c/C, a/A)
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with respect to c/C and a/A. The expression εT
′,v (v) denotes the elasticity of T ′ (v) with
respect to v. Consequently, εT
′,v (P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)) gives the value that εT
′,v (v) takes at
v = P (c)Q (c/C, a/A).
Proof of A)
Proof of A-i) From (B.46)–(B.49) is obvious that the assumptions given in (B.27) and (B.28),
T ′ > 0, T ′′ < 0, P > 0, P ′ > 0, P ′′ ≤ 0, (B.59)
Q > 0, Qc/C ≥ 0, Qa/A ≥ 0, Qc/C > 0 ∨Qa/A > 0, (B.60)
ensure that the instantaneous utility function (B.26) is well-behaved in the sense that all assump-
tions made in (2) are satisfied, i.e., uc > 0, ucc < 0, uc/C ≥ 0, ua/A ≥ 0, and uc/C > 0∨ua/A > 0.
Proof of A-ii) From (B.53) it follows that if P ′ > 0, Q > 0, and T ′ > 0 holds, then
ucc (c, c/C, a/A) is strictly negative if and only if
εT
′,v (P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)) εP,c (c) + εP
′,c (c) < 0. (B.61)
Consequently, the instantaneous utility function (B.26) is still well-behaved if in (B.27) the
assumption P ′′ ≤ 0 is replaced by a weaker assumption (B.61) that does not rule out that
P ′′ > 0 holds.
Proof of A-iii) The assumptions P (c) > 0 and Q (c/C, a/A) > 0 that are included in (B.27)
and (B.28) ensure that v (c, c/C, a/A) = P (c)Q (c/C, a/A) > 0. Consequently, in our approach
transformations T that are not defined for v < 0, such as functions of the CRRA-type, are not
ruled out from the outset. 
Proof of B)
Substituting (B.50)–(B.52) into the definitions of mc/C (c, c/C, a/A) and ma/A (c, c/C, a/A)
given in (11), we obtain
mc/C (c, c/C, a/A) ≡ c/C
c
× uc/C (c, c/C, a/A)
uc (c, c/C, a/A)
=
εQ,c/C (c/C, a/A)
εP,c (c)
,
ma/A (c, c/C, a/A) ≡ a/A
c
× ua/A (c, c/C, a/A)
uc (c, c/C, a/A)
=
εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A)
εP,c (c)
.
Consequently, in symmetric situations, in which c = C and a = A hold, we have
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = εˆQ,c/C/εP,c (C) , (B.62)
ma/A (C, 1, 1) = εˆQ,a/A/εP,c (C) , (B.63)
where the constants εˆQ,c/C and εˆQ,a/A give the values that the elasticities εQ,c/C and εQ,a/A take
at (c/C, a/A) = (1, 1):
εˆQ,c/C ≡ εQ,c/C (1, 1) , εˆQ,a/A ≡ εQ,a/A (1, 1) . (B.64)
The assumptions made in (B.28), Q > 0, Qc/C ≥ 0, Qa/A ≥ 0, and Qc/C > 0∨Qa/A > 0, imply
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that
εˆQ,c/C ≥ 0, εˆQ,a/A ≥ 0, εˆQ,c/C ∨ εˆQ,a/A > 0. (B.65)
Substituting (B.62) and (B.63) into the definition of the comparison-induced extra return factor
given by (22) we obtain
ηD (C) ≡ m
a/A (C, 1, 1)
1 +mc/C (C, 1, 1)
=
εˆQ,a/A/εP,c (C)
1 + εˆQ,c/C/εP,c (C)
=
εˆQ,a/A
εP,c (C) + εˆQ,c/C
. (B.66)
From (B.62), (B.63), and (B.66) it is obvious that mc/C (C, 1, 1), ma/A (C, 1, 1), and ηD (C)
are constant functions of C if and only if the elasticity of the function P (c) with respect to c,
εP,c (c), is a constant function of c. It is easily verified that εP,c (c) is a constant function of c
if and only if the function P (c) has the form given by (B.31),
P (c) = ξ0c
ξ1 , c > 0, (B.67)
where ξ0 and ξ1 are constants. These considerations prove the validity of the first assertion
made in item B): The functions mc/C , ma/A, and ηD that result from the specification of the
instantaneous utility function u = u (c, c/C, a/A) given by (B.26) have the properties described
in (B.30),
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C , ma/A (C, 1, 1) = mˆa/A, ηD (C) = ηˆ, ∀C > 0,
if and only if the function P (c) has the form given by (B.67) [= (B.31)].
Next, we derive the parameter restrictions given in (B.32). In (B.27) it is assumed that
both P (c) > 0 and P ′ (c) > 0 hold for c > 0. In order to ensure that (B.67) [= (B.31)] satisfies
these two assumptions we have to introduce the following two restrictions with respect to its
parameters:
ξ0 > 0, ξ1 > 0. (B.68)
Obviously, the assumptions made in (B.68) coincide with those made in (B.32).
From (B.67) and (B.68) it follows that
εP,c (c) = ξ1 > 0, ∀c > 0. (B.69)
Using (B.69), (B.62), (B.63), (B.65), and (B.66) it is easily verified that
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = εˆQ,c/C/ξ1 ≡ mˆc/C ≥ 0, ∀C > 0, (B.70)
ma/A (C, 1, 1) = εˆQ,a/A/ξ1 ≡ mˆa/A ≥ 0, ∀C > 0, (B.71)
ηD (C) =
εˆQ,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
≡ ηˆ ≥ 0, ∀C > 0, (B.72)
and max
{
mˆc/C , mˆa/A
}
> 0, where the definitions of εˆQ,c/C and εˆQ,a/A are given by (B.64). The
last three results play a decisive role in the proofs of C) and D).
Proof of C)
Substituting (B.67) [= (B.31)] into (B.26) and taking into account (B.68) [= (B.32)] we
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obtain the instantaneous utility function (B.33)
u (c, c/C, a/A) = T
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
)
, ξ0 > 0, ξ1 > 0. (B.73)
Since according to (B.70), mc/C (C, 1, 1) is a constant function of C, the elasticity of mc/C
with respect to own consumption c,
εm
c/C ,c (c, c/C, a/A) ≡ mc/Cc (c, c/C, a/A)×
[
mc/C (c, c/C, a/A)
]−1
c,
evaluated at (c, c/C, a/A) = (C, 1, 1) has the property that
εm
c/C ,c (C, 1, 1) = 0, ∀C > 0.
Substituting the last result into the definition of the effective elasticity of intertemporal substi-
tution given by (21),
σD (C) ≡ −
[
εuc,c (C, 1, 1) +
mc/C (C, 1, 1)
1 +mc/C (C, 1, 1)
× εmc/C ,c (C, 1, 1)
]−1
,
we obtain
σD (C) = − 1
εuc,c (C, 1, 1)
. (B.74)
From (B.74) it follows that σD (C) is a constant function of C if and only if εuc,c (C, 1, 1) is a
constant function of C. From (B.50) and (B.53) it follows that the elasticity of the marginal
utility of absolute consumption uc with respect to absolute consumption c can be expressed in
the following form:
εuc,c (c, c/C, a/A) ≡ ucc (c, c/C, a/A)× [uc (c, c/C, a/A)]−1 c
= εP,c (c) εT
′,v (P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)) + εP
′,c (c) ,
where the elasticities εP,c (c), εP
′,c (c), and εT
′,v (c) are defined in (B.54), (B.58), and (B.57).
The expression εT
′,v (P (c)Q (c/C, a/A)) signifies that the elasticity εT
′,v (v) is evaluated at
v = P (c)Q (c/C, a/A). The specification of P (c) given by (B.67) [= (B.31)], P (c) = ξ0c
ξ1 ,
implies that εP,c (c) = ξ1 and ε
P ′,c (c) = ξ1 − 1 hold for c > 0. Using these results we obtain
εuc,c (c, c/C, a/A) = ξ1ε
T ′,v
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
)
+ ξ1 − 1.
In symmetric situations in which (c, c/C, a/A) = (C, 1, 1) we thus have
εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = ξ1ε
T ′,v
(
ξ0C
ξ1Q (1, 1)
)
+ ξ1 − 1. (B.75)
Obviously, εuc,c (C, 1, 1) and σD (C) = − [εuc,c (C, 1, 1)]−1 [see (B.74)] are constant functions of
C if and only if εT
′,v (ξ0Cξ1Q (1, 1)) is a constant function of C. Since ξ0 > 0 and ξ1 > 0 [see
(B.68)] and Q (c/C, a/A) > 0 hold over the domain of Q [see (B.28)], εT
′,v (ξ0Cξ1Q (1, 1)) is a
constant function of C for C > 0 if and only if εT
′,v (v) is a constant function of v for v > 0. The
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assumptions made in (B.27) require that T ′ > 0 and T ′′ < 0. Hence, admissible transformations
T have the property that εT
′,v (v) ≡ T ′′(v)× [T ′ (v)]−1 v < 0 holds for v > 0.
We can summarize these considerations as follows: If the transformation T (v) is admissible
in the sense that T ′ (v) > 0 and T ′′ (v) < 0 hold for v > 0, then the instantaneous utility
function (B.73), u (c, c/C, a/A) = T
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
)
, has the property that εuc,c (C, 1, 1)
and σD (C) = − [εuc,c (C, 1, 1)]−1 are constant functions of C for C > 0 if and only if the
function T satisfies the condition
εT
′,v (v) = −θ, v > 0, (B.76)
where θ is an arbitrary strictly positive constant, θ > 0. It is well-known that εT
′,v (v) = −θ < 0
holds for v > 0 if and only if the function T (v) is of the CRRA type, i.e.,
T (v) = κ0 + κ1
v1−θ − 1
1− θ , v > 0, (B.77)
where κ0 and κ1 are constants. These considerations prove the validity of the first assertion
made in item C): The functions εuc,c (C, 1, 1) and σD (C) that result from the specification of
the instantaneous utility function u (c, c/C, a/A) = T
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
)
given by (B.33) [=
(B.73)] have the properties described in (B.34),
εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c, σD (C) = σˆ, ∀C > 0,
if and only if the function T (v) has the form given by (B.77) [= (B.35)].
Next, we derive the parameter restrictions given in (B.36). To ensure that T ′ > 0 and
T ′′ < 0 hold as required by (B.27), we have to assume that κ1 > 0 holds in addition to θ > 0.
Moreover, we have to ensure that either P ′′ ≤ 0 holds or condition (B.29) satisfied.
The specification of P (c) and T (v) given by (B.67) [= (B.31)] and (B.77) [= (B.35)] imply
that P ′′ (c) = −ξ0ξ1 (1− ξ1) cξ1−2 and that condition (B.29) becomes −θξ1 + ξ1 − 1 < 0. In the
following we use the latter condition because it is weaker than the condition ξ1 ≤ 1 that results
from the requirement that P ′′ (c) ≤ 0. We can summarize these considerations as follows: In
order to ensure that T ′ (v) > 0 and T ′′ (v) < 0 hold as required by (B.27), and that also the
condition (B.29) is satisfied, it is assumed that
κ1 > 0, θ > 0, 1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 > 0 (B.78)
holds in addition to (B.32). Obviously, the assumptions made in (B.78) are identical to those
given in (B.36).
Using (B.75), (B.76), (B.78), and (B.74) we obtain
εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = − [1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] ≡ εˆuc,c < 0, ∀C > 0, (B.79)
σD (C) = − 1
εuc,c (C, 1, 1)
=
1
1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 ≡ σˆ > 0, ∀C > 0. (B.80)
The last two results play an important role in the following proof of D).
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Proof of D)
Substituting the specifications of T (v) and P (c) given by (B.77) [= (B.35)] and (B.67) [=
(B.31)] into (B.26) and taking into account (B.60) [= (B.28)], (B.68) [= (B.32)] and (B.78) [=
(B.36)], we obtain the instantaneous utility function
u (c, c/C, a/A) = κ0 +
κ1
1− θ
{[
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
]1−θ − 1} , (B.81)
where the parameters satisfy the conditions
κ1 > 0, ξ0 > 0, ξ1 > 0, θ > 0, 1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 > 0 (B.82)
and the function Q (c/C, a/A) satisfies the conditions given in (B.28). The specification given
by (B.81) is identical to the specification given by (B.37). The assumptions made in (B.82) are
identical to the assumptions made in (B.38).
Proof of D-i) It is easily verified that
uc (c, c/C, a/A) = ξ1κ1c
−1
[
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
]1−θ
> 0,
ucc (c, c/C, a/A) = − [1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] ξ1κ1c−2
[
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
]1−θ
< 0,
uc/C (c, c/C, a/A) = κ1 (c/C)
−1
[
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
]1−θ
εQ,c/C (c/C, a/A) ≥ 0,
ua/A (c, c/C, a/A) = κ1 (a/A)
−1
[
ξ0c
ξ1Q (c/C, a/A)
]1−θ
εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A) ≥ 0.
The parameter restrictions given in (B.82) [= (B.38)] and the assumptions made in (B.60) [=
(B.28)] with respect to the function Q (c/C, a/A) ensure that the instantaneous utility function
(B.81) [= (B.37)] is well-behaved in the sense that all assumptions made in (2) are satisfied,
i.e.,
uc > 0, ucc < 0, uc/C ≥ 0, ua/A ≥ 0, uc/C > 0 ∨ ua/A > 0.
Proof of D-ii) For the convenience of the reader, the tedious derivation of (B.39) and (B.40)
given in D)-ii) is deferred to the end of the proof.
Proof of D-iii) From (B.70), (B.71), (B.64), and (B.79) it follows that the conditions given
by (32) in Proposition 3 are satisfied, since mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C , ma/A (C, 1, 1) = mˆa/A, and
εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c hold for C > 0, where
mˆc/C ≡ εˆ
Q,c/C
ξ1
≥ 0, mˆa/A ≡ εˆ
Q,a/A
ξ1
≥ 0, εˆuc,c ≡ − [1 + (θ − 1) ξ1] < 0. (B.83)
The constants εˆQ,c/C and εˆQ,a/A denote the values that the elasticities of the functionQ (c/C, a/A)
with respect to c/C and a/A, εQ,c/C (c/C, a/A) and εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A), take in symmetric situ-
ations, i.e., at (c/C, a/A) = (1, 1):
εˆQ,c/C ≡ εQ,c/C (1, 1) , εˆQ,a/A ≡ εQ,a/A (1, 1) . (B.84)
These results given in (B.83) and (B.84) prove the validity of (B.41) and (B.42).
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Proof of D-iv) From (B.72), (B.64), and (B.80) it follows that the conditions given in (25)
in Proposition 1 are satisfied, because σD (C) = σˆ and ηD (C) = ηˆ hold for C > 0, where
σˆ ≡ 1
1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 > 0, ηˆ ≡
εˆQ,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
≥ 0. (B.85)
These results given in (B.85) prove the validity of (B.43).
We know from Proposition 1 that if these constants σˆ and ηˆ satisfy the condition (26),
max
{
[1− (1/σˆ)] [fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L)]
1 + ηˆ
, 0
}
< ρ < fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L) ,
then an economically meaningful decentralized BGP exists. Substituting the results for σˆ and
ηˆ given by (B.85) into equation (27) [see Proposition 1],
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
,
we obtain
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ εˆ
Q,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
× f (1, L)
1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 + εˆ
Q,a/A/ξ1
1 + εˆQ,c/C/ξ1
. (B.86)
Obviously, Equation (B.86) is identical to Equation (B.44).
Proof of D-v) Since the validity of all assertions made in D-v) is verified at first glance, we
skip the proof.
Proof of D-ii) Finally, we derive the conditions (B.39) and (B.40), which ensure that the
alternative representation of the utility function given by V (c, C, a,A) ≡ u (c, c/C, a/A) that
results from (B.81) [= (B.37)], where the parameters and the function Q (c/C, a/A) satisfy
(B.38) and (B.28), respectively, is well-behaved, in the sense that all assumptions made in (4),
Vcc < 0, and VccVaa − (Vca)2 > 0 if ua/A > 0,
are satisfied. According to (A.1) and (A.2), we have
Vcc = ucc + 2C
−1uc(c/C) + C−2u(c/C)(c/C)
VccVaa − (Vca)2 = A−2
[
ucc + 2C
−1uc(c/C) + C−2u(c/C)(c/C)
]
u(a/A)(a/A)
−A−2 [uc(a/A) + C−1u(c/C)(a/A)]2 .
It can be shown that
uc = ξ1κ1ξ
1−θ
0 c
ξ1(1−θ)−1Q1−θ,
ucc = − [1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] ξ1κ1ξ1−θ0 cξ1(1−θ)−2Q1−θ,
uc/C = κ1ξ
1−θ
0 c
ξ1(1−θ)Q−θQc/C
= κ1 (c/C)
−1
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ
εQ,c/C ,
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ua/A = κ1ξ
1−θ
0 c
ξ1(1−θ)Q−θQa/A
= κ1 (a/A)
−1
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ
εQ,a/A,
uc(c/C) = (1− θ) ξ1κ1ξ1−θ0 cξ1(1−θ)−1Q−θQc/C
= (1− θ) ξ1κ1c−1 (c/C)−1
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ
εQ,c/C ,
uc(a/A) = (1− θ) ξ1κ1ξ1−θ0 cξ1(1−θ)−1Q−θQa/A
= (1− θ) ξ1κ1c−1 (a/A)−1
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ
εQ,a/A,
u(c/C)(c/C) = κ1ξ
1−θ
0 c
ξ1(1−θ)
[
−θQ−θ−1Q2c/C +Q−θQ(c/C)(c/C)
]
= κ1 (c/C)
−2
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ
εQ,c/C
(
−θεQ,c/C + εQc/C ,c/C
)
,
u(c/C)(a/A) = κ1ξ
1−θ
0 c
ξ1(1−θ)
(
−θQ−θ−1Qa/AQc/C +Q−θQ(c/C)(a/A)
)
= κ1 (c/C)
−1 (a/A)−1
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ
εQ,c/C
(
−θεQ,a/A + εQc/C ,a/A
)
,
u(a/A)(a/A) = κ1ξ
1−θ
0 c
ξ1(1−θ)
[
−θQ−θ−1Q2a/A +Q−θQ(a/A)(a/A)
]
= κ1 (a/A)
−2
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ
εQ,a/A
(
−θεQ,a/A + εQa/A,a/A
)
,
where
εQ,c/C (c/C, a/A) ≡ Qc/C (c/C, a/A)× [Q (c/C, a/A)]−1 (c/C) ,
εQ,a/A (c/C, a/A) ≡ Qa/A (c/C, a/A)× [Q (c/C, a/A)]−1 (a/A) ,
εQc/C ,c/C (c/C, a/A) ≡ Q(c/C)(c/C) (c/C, a/A)×
[
Qc/C (c/C, a/A)
]−1
(c/C) ,
εQc/C ,a/A (c/C, a/A) ≡ Q(c/C)(a/A) (c/C, a/A)×
[
Qc/C (c/C, a/A)
]−1
(a/A) ,
εQa/A,a/A (c/C, a/A) ≡ Q(a/A)(a/A) (c/C, a/A)×
[
Qa/A (c/C, a/A)
]−1
(a/A)
and
Q > 0, Qc/C ≥ 0, Qa/A ≥ 0, Qc/C > 0 ∨Qa/A > 0,
κ1 > 0, ξ0 > 0, ξ1 > 0, θ > 0, 1 + (θ − 1) ξ1 > 0,
hold according to (B.28) and (B.38). Using these results it can be shown that
Vcc = −κ1c−2
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ ×
×
{
[1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] ξ1 + εQ,c/C
[
2 (θ − 1) ξ1 + θεQ,c/C − εQc/C ,c/C
]}
,
Vaa = −κ1a−2
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ
εQ,a/A
(
θεQ,a/A − εQa/A,a/A
)
,
Vca = κ1 (ca)
−1
(
ξ0c
ξ1Q
)1−θ {[
(1− θ) ξ1 − θεQ,c/C
]
εQ,a/A + εQ,c/CεQc/C ,a/A
}
.
Our assumptions imply that Vcc < 0 holds if and only if
0 < [1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] ξ1 + εQ,c/C
[
2 (θ − 1) ξ1 + θεQ,c/C − εQc/C ,c/C
]
.
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This condition is identical to condition (B.39).
Moreover, VccVaa − (Vca)2 > 0 holds if and only if
0 <
{
[1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] ξ1 + εQ,c/C
[
2 (θ − 1) ξ1 + θεQ,c/C − εQc/C ,c/C
]}
×
×εQ,a/A
(
θεQ,a/A − εQa/A,a/A
)
−
{[
(1− θ) ξ1 − θεQ,c/C
]
εQ,a/A + εQ,c/CεQc/C ,a/A
}2
.
This second condition is only relevant if sgn
(
ua/A
)
= sgn
(
Qa/A
)
> 0. Obviously, it is identical
to condition (B.40). 
B.8 Proof of point A) of Corollary 1
Let the instantaneous utility function take the form given by (44), where the parameters satisfy
the conditions given by (45) and (46):
u (c, c/C, a/A) =
1
1− θ
{[
cξ1 (c/C)ξ2 (a/A)ξ3
]1−θ − 1} ,
θ > 0, ξ1 > 0, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ3 ≥ 0, max {ξ2, ξ3} > 0,
(1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3) < 1.
Obviously, the alternative representation of the utility function given by V (c, C, a,A) ≡
u (c, c/C, a/A) takes the following form:
V (c, C, a,A) =
1
1− θ
[(
cξ1+ξ2C−ξ2aξ3A−ξ3
)1−θ − 1] .
The following properties of u and V are easily verified:
uc = ξ1c
−1
[
cξ1 (c/C)ξ2 (a/A)ξ3
]1−θ
,
ucc = −ξ1 [1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] c−2
[
cξ1 (c/C)ξ2 (a/A)ξ3
]1−θ
,
uc/C = ξ2 (c/C)
−1
[
cξ1 (c/C)ξ2 (a/A)ξ3
]1−θ
,
ua/A = ξ3 (a/A)
−1
[
cξ1 (c/C)ξ2 (a/A)ξ3
]1−θ
,
Vc = (ξ1 + ξ2) c
−1
(
cξ1+ξ2aξ3C−ξ2A−ξ3
)1−θ
,
Vcc = − (ξ1 + ξ2) [1 + (ξ1 + ξ2) (θ − 1)] c−2
(
cξ1+ξ2aξ3C−ξ2A−ξ3
)1−θ
,
Va = ξ3a
−1
(
cξ1+ξ2aξ3C−ξ2A−ξ3
)1−θ
,
Vaa = −ξ3 [1 + ξ3 (θ − 1)] a−2
(
cξ1+ξ2aξ3C−ξ2A−ξ3
)1−θ
,
Vca = (ξ1 + ξ2) ξ3 (1− θ) (ca)−1
(
cξ1+ξ2aξ3C−ξ2A−ξ3
)1−θ
,
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VccVaa − (Vca)2 = (ξ1 + ξ2) ξ3 [1 + (θ − 1) (ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3)]×
× (ca)−2
(
cξ1+ξ2aξ3C−ξ2A−ξ3
)2(1−θ)
.
First, we prove that all assumptions made in (2) are satisfied. From the results given above
it is obvious that
uc > 0⇔ ξ1 > 0, ucc < 0⇔ ξ1 [1 + ξ1 (θ − 1)] > 0,
uc/C ≥ 0⇔ ξ2 ≥ 0, ua/A ≥ 0⇔ ξ3 ≥ 0.
Since, by assumption (45), ξ1 > 0, ξ2 ≥ 0, ξ3 ≥ 0, and max {ξ2, ξ3} > 0 hold, we obtain uc > 0,
uc/C ≥ 0, ua/A ≥ 0, and uc/C > 0 ∨ ua/A > 0.
It remains to show that ucc < 0 holds, too. Since ξ1 > 0 holds by assumption we have
ucc < 0⇔ (1− θ) ξ1 < 1.
Obviously, θ ≥ 1 is sufficient (but not necessary) for ucc < 0. In the opposite case in which
θ < 1 holds, we obtain
(1− θ) ξ1 < (ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3) (1− θ) ,
where we made use of the fact that max {ξ2, ξ3} > 0 holds due to assumption (45). Taking into
account that (1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3) < 1 holds due to assumption (46), it is clear that (1− θ) ξ1 <
1 so that the assumption ucc < 0 is also satisfied if θ < 1 holds.
Second, we prove that all assumptions made in (4) are satisfied. Since ξ1 > 0 and ξ2 ≥ 0
hold by assumption, it follows from the expression for Vcc given above that
Vcc < 0⇔ (1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2) < 1.
Obviously, θ ≥ 1 is sufficient (but not necessary) for Vcc < 0. In the opposite case in which
θ < 1 holds, we obtain
(1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2) ≤ (ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3) (1− θ) .
Taking into account that (1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3) < 1 holds due to assumption (46) it is clear that
(1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2) < 1 so that the assumption Vcc < 0 is also satisfied if θ < 1 holds.
Finally, we have to show that VccVaa− (Vca)2 > 0 holds if ua/A > 0. Recall that ua/A > 0⇔
ξ3 > 0. If ξ3 > 0 holds in addition to ξ1 > 0 and ξ2 ≥ 0, then
VccVaa − (Vca)2 > 0⇔ (1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3) < 1.
Since the condition given on the right-hand side is satisfied due to assumption (46), we obtain
VccVaa − (Vca)2 > 0 for ua/A > 0. 
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C The decentralized solution – Part II (Section 4)
C.1 Generalization of (52)
Let u be of the (44)-type and exhibit the property that the parameter ξ2 itself is a function
of other parameters pi1, . . . , pim, ξ2 = ξ2 (pi1, . . . , pim), and the same is true for the parameters
ξ1, ξ3, and θ. In this case the standard approach is confronted with the additional problem of
identifying the parameter pik out of {pi1, . . . , pim} that seems to be the appropriate measure of
the strength of the relative consumption motive. Its second problem is well-known from above:
The derivative dgD/dpik may deviate from the adequate measure ∂g
D/∂mˆc/C both quantitatively
and qualitatively due to effects of changes in pik via the mˆ
a/A- and the |εˆuc,c|-channels. In this
more general case of functional dependence, the decomposition (52) has to be replaced by the
following slightly more complicated equation:
dgD
dpik
=
∂gD
∂mˆc/C
· dmˆ
c/C
dpik
+
∂gD
∂mˆa/A
· dmˆ
a/A
dpik
+
∂gD
∂ |εˆuc,c| ·
d |εˆuc,c|
dpik
=
∂gD
∂mˆc/C
(
1
ξ1
∂ξ2
∂pik
− ξ2
ξ21
∂ξ1
∂pik
)
+
∂gD
∂mˆa/A
(
1
ξ1
∂ξ3
∂pik
− ξ3
ξ21
∂ξ1
∂pik
)
+
∂gD
∂ |εˆuc,c|
(
∂θ
∂pik
ξ1 + (θ − 1) ∂ξ1
∂pik
)
.
The validity of this decomposition is easily verified by using the fact that, according to (47)
and (48) we have mˆc/C = ξ2/ξ1, mˆ
a/A = ξ3/ξ1, and |εˆuc,c| = 1 + (θ − 1) ξ1.
C.2 Appropriate restrictions on the Gal´ı specification (55)
Let u take the Gal´ı form given by (55)
u (c, c/C) =
1
1− θ
[
c[1−(1−γ)θ]/(1−θ) (c/C)−γθ/(1−θ)
]1−θ
, θ > 0. (C.1)
It is obvious that u = u (c, c/C) is of the type given by (44), where
ξ1 = 1− ξ2 = 1− (1− γ) θ
1− θ , ξ2 = −
γθ
1− θ , ξ3 = 0, (C.2)
while the irrelevant constant term “−1” is ignored.
Since ξ3 = 0, the restrictions (45) and (46) given in Corollary 1 simplify to
θ > 0, ξ1 > 0, ξ2 > 0, (1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2) < 1. (C.3)
If these restrictions are satisfied, then according to item A) of Corollary 1, the instantaneous
utility function u = u (c, c/C) given by (55) [= (C.1)] and the resulting representation of prefer-
ences given by V (c, C, a,A) ≡ u (c, c/C, a/A) are well-behaved in the sense that all assumptions
made in (2) and (4) are satisfied.
Taking into account that ξ1 + ξ2 = 1, it is obvious that the condition (1− θ) (ξ1 + ξ2) < 1
given in (C.3) is satisfied. Hence, it remains to be shown that ξ1 > 0 and ξ2 > 0. It is clear
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that
ξ2 > 0⇔ sgn (γ) = −sgn (1− θ) , (C.4)
ξ1 > 0⇔ sgn (1− (1− γ) θ) = sgn (1− θ) . (C.5)
The expression in (C.4) implies that we have to distinguish two cases with respect to θ.
Case A) Let θ > 1. From (C.4) and (C.5) it follows that
ξ2 > 0⇔ γ > 0, (C.6)
ξ1 > 0⇔ 1− (1− γ) θ < 0⇔ γ < θ − 1
θ
. (C.7)
Combining (C.6) and (C.7), we obtain
θ > 1 and 0 < γ <
θ − 1
θ
< 1⇒ ξ1 > 0, ξ2 > 0.
This completes the proof of case A) described in (56).
Case B) Let θ < 1. From (C.4) and (C.5) it follows that
ξ2 > 0⇔ γ < 0, (C.8)
ξ1 > 0⇔ 1− (1− γ) θ > 0⇔ −1− θ
θ
< γ. (C.9)
Combining (C.8) and (C.9), we obtain
θ < 1 and − 1− θ
θ
< γ < 0⇒ ξ1 > 0, ξ2 > 0.
This completes the proof of case B) described in (56).
C.3 Appropriate restrictions on the specification #3
In specification #3 the function V = V (c, C) takes the form
V (c, C) =
1
1− θ

[(
cϕ − κCϕ
1− κ
)1/ϕ]1−θ
− 1
 , 0 < κ < 1, 0 < 1− ϕ < θ,
where the domain of V is given by ΘV ≡ {(c, C) |c > 0, C > 0, cϕ − κCϕ > 0}. The correspond-
ing representation of the function u = u (c, c/C) is given by (58),
u (c, c/C) =
1
1− θ

[
c
(
1− κ (c/C)−ϕ
1− κ
)1/ϕ]1−θ
− 1
 .
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From
Vc =
(
cϕ − κCϕ
1− κ
)(1−θ−ϕ)/ϕ cϕ−1
1− κ,
Vcc = − [θ − (1− ϕ)]
(
cϕ − κCϕ
1− κ
)(1−θ−2ϕ)/ϕ( cϕ−1
1− κ
)2
− (1− ϕ)
(
cϕ − κCϕ
1− κ
)(1−θ−ϕ)/ϕ cϕ−2
1− κ,
it follows that the assumptions 0 < κ < 1 and 0 < 1 − ϕ < θ are sufficient for Vc > 0 and
Vcc < 0 so that all assumptions made in (4) are satisfied.
From
uc = c
−θ
(
1− κ (c/C)−ϕ
1− κ
)(1−θ)/ϕ
,
ucc = −θc−θ−1
(
1− κ (c/C)−ϕ
1− κ
)(1−θ)/ϕ
,
uc/C =
κ
1− κc
1−θ
(
1− κ (c/C)−ϕ
1− κ
)(1−θ−ϕ)/ϕ
(c/C)−ϕ−1 ,
it follows that the assumptions 0 < κ < 1 and 0 < 1 − ϕ < θ are also sufficient for uc > 0,
ucc < 0, and uc/C > 0 so that all assumptions made in (2) are satisfied.
C.4 A generalized version of specification #6
We replace the simple specifications of u˜ (c, s) and s (c/C, a/A) that are used in (64),
u˜ (c, s) =
1
1− θ
[(
c1−βsβ
)1−θ − 1] , s (c/C, a/A) = (c/C)φ (a/A)1−φ ,
where θ > 0, 0 < β < 1, 1 + (θ − 1) (1− β) > 0, and 0 < φ < 1, by the more general functions
u˜ (c, s) =
1
1− θ
[
(cχ1sχ2)1−θ − 1
]
, χ1 > 0, χ2 > 0, 1 + (θ − 1)χ1 > 0, (C.10)
s (c/C, a/A) = (c/C)φ1 (a/A)φ2 , φ1 ≥ 0, φ2 ≥ 0, max {φ1, φ2} > 0, (C.11)
and do not impose any functional dependence on the five parameters θ, χ1, χ2, φ1, and φ2. The
following properties of the utility function defined by (C.10) are easily verified:
ms (c, s) ≡ s
c
× u˜s (c, s)
u˜c (c, s)
=
χ2
χ1
≡ mˆs > 0, ∀ (c, s) ∈ Θu˜, (C.12)
εu˜c,c (c, s) ≡ cu˜cc (c, s)
u˜c (c, s)
= − [1 + (θ − 1)χ1] ≡ εˆu˜c,c < 0, ∀ (c, s) ∈ Θu˜, (C.13)
where Θu˜ denotes the domain of the function u˜ (c, s), m
s represents the percentage-MRS of
status s for absolute consumption c, and εu˜c,c denotes the elasticity of the marginal utility of
absolute consumption u˜c (c, s) with respect to absolute consumption c. From (C.12)–(C.13) it is
obvious that ms (c, s) and εu˜c,c (c, s) are constant functions over the domain Θu˜. Consequently,
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mˆs measures the global strength of the quest for overall status (as determined by both relative
consumption and relative wealth), while 1/
∣∣εˆu˜c,c∣∣ is a measure of the global willingness to
substitute absolute consumption over time. The status function defined by (C.11) exhibits
the property that its elasticities with respect to relative consumption and relative wealth are
constant functions over the domain of s (c/C, a/A) denoted by Θs, since
εs,c/C (c/C, a/A) = φ1 ≡ εˆs,c/C ≥ 0, εs,a/A (c/C, a/A) = φ2 ≡ εˆs,a/A ≥ 0 (C.14)
hold for all (c/C, a/A) ∈ Θs.
The specifications given by (C.10) and (C.11) imply that the resulting representation of the
instantaneous utility function u (c, c/C, a/A) ≡ u˜ (c, s (c/C, a/A)),
u (c, c/C, a/A) =
1
1− θ
[(
cχ1 (c/C)χ2φ1 (a/A)χ2φ2
)1−θ − 1] , (C.15)
is of the simple form given by (44) with
ξ1 = χ1, ξ2 = χ2φ1, ξ3 = χ2φ2. (C.16)
In contrast to Section 4 we do not restrict attention to the special case in which ξ1 + ξ2 + ξ3 = 1
holds. Consequently, the resulting three fundamental factors are given by
mˆc/C =
χ2
χ1
× φ1 ≥ 0, mˆa/A = χ2
χ1
× φ2 ≥ 0, |εˆuc,c| = [1 + (θ − 1)χ1] > 0. (C.17)
These results are either derived by substituting (C.16) into (47) and (48) or by using the fact
that
mˆc/C = mˆs × εˆs,c/C , mˆa/A = mˆs × εˆs,a/A, εˆuc,c = εˆu˜c,c, (C.18)
where mˆs, εˆu˜c,c, εˆs,c/C , and εˆs,a/A are defined in (C.12)–(C.14). The results given in (C.17) and
(C.18) imply that
σˆ ≡ 1|εˆuc,c| =
1
|εˆu˜c,c| =
1
1 + (θ − 1)χ1 ,
ηˆ ≡ mˆ
a/A
1 + mˆc/C
=
mˆs × εˆs,a/A
1 + mˆs × εˆs,c/C =
(χ2/χ1)× φ2
1 + (χ2/χ1)× φ1 ,
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ (χ2/χ1)× φ2
1 + (χ2/χ1)× φ1 f (1, L)
1 + (θ − 1)χ1 + (χ2/χ1)× φ2
1 + (χ2/χ1)× φ1
. (C.19)
As long as the quite general specification (C.15) is used and no functional dependence between
the five parameters θ, χ1, χ2, φ1, and φ2 is imposed, the application of the standard analysis
allows for correct answers with respect to the implications of relative consumption and relative
wealth preferences. The validity of this assertion is easily verified in three steps by using (C.17)
and Proposition 4: 1) Changes in φ1 affect only the percentage-MRS of relative consumption
mˆc/C , while exerting no effect on mˆa/A and |εˆuc,c|. Since mˆc/C depends positively on φ1, the
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qualitative effects of ceteris paribus changes in the strength of the relative consumption motive
can be correctly inferred from the sign of ∂gD/∂φ1, where g
D is given by (C.19). 2) Changes
in φ2 affect only the percentage-MRS of relative wealth mˆ
a/A, while having no effect on mˆc/C
and |εˆuc,c|. Since mˆa/A depends positively on φ2, the sign of ∂gD/∂φ2 can be used to assess the
qualitative implications of ceteris paribus changes in the strength of the relative wealth motive.
3) The following properties of ∂gD/∂φ1 and ∂g
D/∂φ2 are easily verified: (a) ∂g
D/∂φ2 > 0 holds
regardless of whether φ1 = 0 or φ1 > 0. (b) If φ2 = 0, then g
D is independent of φ1. (c) If
φ2 > 0, then ∂g
D/∂φ1 < 0. Hence, the standard analysis yields results that coincide with those
given in Proposition 4: (a) The decentralized growth rate gD depends positively on the strength
of the relative wealth motive, irrespective of the strength of the relative consumption motive.
(b) If relative wealth is irrelevant for utility, then relative consumption preferences do not affect
gD. (c) In the presence of relative wealth preferences, gD depends negatively on the strength
of the relative consumption motive.
Finally, the specification of the instantaneous utility function u˜ (c, s) given by (C.10) enables
the standard approach to analyze changes in the strength of the quest for overall status that are
not accompanied by concurrent changes in the willingness to substitute absolute consumption
intertemporally. This possibility results from the fact that there is no functional dependence
between the exponents of absolute consumption c and status s, χ1 and χ2. More precisely,
a rise in χ2 causes the percentage-MRS of status for absolute consumption mˆ
s = χ2/χ1 [see
(C.12)] to increase, but leaves the elasticity of the marginal utility of absolute consumption
u˜c (c, s) with respect to absolute consumption, εˆ
u˜c,c = − [1 + (θ − 1)χ1] [see (C.13)], unchanged.
From |εˆuc,c| = ∣∣εˆu˜c,c∣∣ [see (C.18)] it then follows that the fundamental factor |εˆuc,c| and the
resulting effective elasticity of intertemporal substitution σˆ = 1/ |εˆuc,c| are also independent
of the parameter χ2. For convenience, in the rest of this analysis we restrict attention to the
case in which both relative consumption and relative wealth matter for status so that φ1 > 0
and φ2 > 0. In this case the rise in mˆ
s = χ2/χ1 that results from the increase in χ2 causes
the fundamental factors mˆc/C and mˆa/A to rise. Please note that the percentage-MRS of
relative wealth a/A for relative consumption c/C given by ma/A/mc/C = φ2/φ1 is unaffected
by the increase in the strength of the overall status motive. The rise in mˆa/A causes the
comparison-induced extra return factor ηˆ to rise, while the rise in mˆc/C leads to a decrease in
ηˆ. From ∂ηˆ/∂χ2 = χ1φ2/ (χ1 + χ2φ1)
2 it follows that the net effect is positive. Hence, the rise
in χ2 exerts a strictly positive effect on the decentralized growth rate g
D via the ηˆ-channel.
Since, as mentioned above, |εˆuc,c| and, hence, σˆ = 1/ |εˆuc,c| are independent of χ2, there is
no additional effect via the σˆ-channel. These considerations show that the traditional analysis
could in principle analyze the effects of a rise in the intensity of the quest for overall status that
is not accompanied by a change in the willingness to substitute absolute consumption over time
correctly by differentiating gD given in (C.19) partially with respect to χ2 and showing that if
both relative consumption and relative wealth matter for status, i.e., φ1 > 0 and φ2 > 0 (recall
that we restricted our attention to this case), then ∂gD/∂χ2 > 0.
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D The socially planned solution and the inefficiency of the de-
centralized solution (Section 5)
D.1 Proof of Proposition 6
Proof of A) Let the instantaneous utility function u satisfy the conditions (32) that were
introduced in the context of the decentralized economy in Proposition 3, i.e.,
mc/C (C, 1, 1) = mˆc/C , ma/A (C, 1, 1) = mˆa/A, εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c, ∀C > 0, (D.1)
where mˆc/C ≥ 0, mˆa/A ≥ 0 (with max{mˆc/C , mˆa/A} > 0), and εˆuc,c < 0.
First, we prove the validity of (76). According to Proposition 3 the conditions given in (32)
[= (D.1)] imply that
σD (C) =
1
|εˆuc,c| , ∀C > 0. (D.2)
Using the definition of σP (C) given in (74),
σP (C) ≡ − 1
εuc,c (C, 1, 1)
,
and the condition
εuc,c (C, 1, 1) = εˆuc,c < 0, ∀C > 0
given in (32) [= (D.1)] we obtain
σP (C) =
1
|εˆuc,c| , ∀C > 0. (D.3)
Combining (D.2) and (D.3) we obtain (76):
σP (C) = σD (C) =
1
|εˆuc,c| ≡ σˆ, ∀C > 0.
Second, we derive the solutions for gP and (C/K)P . Substitution of σP (C) = σˆ, ∀C > 0,
into the Euler equation of aggregate consumption in the socially planned economy that is given
by (74), we obtain
C˙/C = σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ] . (D.4)
From the economy’s resource constraint K˙ = f (1, L)K − C it follows that
K˙/K = f (1, L)− (C/K) . (D.5)
Taking into account that, by assumption, L is exogenously given and constant over time and
that σˆ is a constant, it is obvious from the last two differential equations that there exists
a balanced growth path (BGP) in the socially planned economy in which C and K grow at
the same constant rate so that C/K remains unchanged over time. The steady-state value of
the common growth rate of aggregate consumption and aggregate physical capital denoted by
gP = (C˙/C)P = (K˙/K)P and the steady-state value of the consumption-capital ratio denoted
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by (C/K)P are determined by the following system of equations:
gP = σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ] ,
gP = f (1, L)− (C/K)P .
Solving this system of two equations for gP and (C/K)P , we obtain
gP = σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ] , (D.6)
(C/K)P = (1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ. (D.7)
Third, we derive condition (77) and show that this condition implies the validity of (78).
Using (D.6), we obtain
gP > 0⇔ ρ < f (1, L) . (D.8)
From (D.7) it follows that
(C/K)P > 0⇔ ρ > (σˆ − 1) (σˆ)−1 f (1, L) . (D.9)
In case that σˆ < 1, condition (D.9) is redundant because ρ > 0 holds by assumption.
Along the BGP we have K˙/K = gP at any point in time. Hence, the transversality condition
(75),
lim
t→∞ e
−f(1,L)tK (t) = 0,
requires that
−f (1, L) + gP = − [(1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ] = −(C/K)P < 0. (D.10)
Obviously, the condition that ρ > (σˆ − 1) (σˆ)−1 f (1, L) given in (D.9) implies not only that
(C/K)P > 0, but also ensures that the transversality condition is satisfied.
The results given by (D.8), (D.9), and (D.10) can be summarized as follows: If the condition
max
{
(σˆ − 1) f (1, L)
σˆ
, 0
}
< ρ < f (1, L) (D.11)
is satisfied, then the BGP is economically meaningful in the sense that the growth rate and the
consumption-capital ratio are strictly positive,
gP = σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ] > 0, (C/K)P = (1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ > 0, (D.12)
and, in addition, the transversality condition is fulfilled. Obviously, condition (D.11) is identical
to condition (77). Moreover, (D.12) is identical to (78). 
Proof of B) Finally, we show that if the condition (32) [= (D.1)] is satisfied, then the model
has no transitional dynamics. Let Z ≡ C/K. Since K is a state variable and C is a control
variable, Z = C/K is a control-like variable (this notion is used by Barro and Sala-i-Martin
(1995) on p. 162). In contrast to K, both C and Z = C/K can jump at a certain point in time.
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Using (D.4), (D.5), and C/K = Z, we obtain the following differential equation:
Z˙ = [(C˙/C)− (K˙/K)]Z
= {σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ]− [f (1, L)− Z]}Z
= {Z − [(1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ]}Z ≡ Φ (Z) .
Solving Z˙ = Φ (Z) = 0 for Z, we obtain {Z = 0} and {Z = ZP}, where
ZP = (1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ. (D.13)
Obviously, ZP given by (D.13) is identical to (C/K)P given by (D.7). If (77) [= (D.11)] holds,
then ZP = (C/K)P > 0, so that ZP is the economically meaningful steady-state value of the
consumption-capital ratio. Rewriting Φ (Z) as Φ (Z) =
(
Z − ZP )Z it is easily verified that
Φ′ (Z) = Z +
(
Z − ZP ) , Φ′ (ZP ) = ZP > 0.
Φ′
(
ZP
)
> 0 implies that the economically meaningful steady state of the differential equation
Z˙ = Φ (Z) is unstable. Hence, the perfect-foresight equilibrium path of Z has no transitional
dynamics, i.e., Z (t) = ZP for t ≥ 0. The initial value of the jump variable Z has to be chosen
in such a way that Z (0) = ZP . From Z = C/K and ZP = (C/K)P it then follows that the
initial value of the jump variable C has to be chosen according to C (0) = (C/K)P ×K0, where
(C/K)P is given by (78) [= (D.7)] and K0 is exogenously given.
From Z (t) = ZP for t ≥ 0, (D.4), (D.5), Z = C/K, and (D.12) it then follows that
C˙/C = σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ] = gP > 0,
K˙/K = f (1, L)− ZP = σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ] = gP > 0,
hold for t ≥ 0. The growth rates of consumption and capital are constant over time, identical,
and equal to gP . Consequently, the growth rates of C and K have no transitional dynamics. 
D.2 Proof of Proposition 7
Proof of i) We assume that the conditions given by (26) and (77),
max
{
[1− (1/σˆ)] [fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L)]
1 + ηˆ
, 0
}
< ρ < fk (1, L) + ηˆf (1, L) ,
max
{
(σˆ − 1) f (1, L)
σˆ
, 0
}
< ρ < f (1, L) ,
are satisfied so that in both the decentralized economy and the socially planned economy an
economically meaningful BGP exists. The corresponding solutions for gP and gD are given by
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[see (78) and (27)]:
gP = σˆ [f (1, L)− ρ] > 0, (D.14)
gD =
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
> 0. (D.15)
From (D.14) it is obvious that the socially optimal growth rate gP is independent of ηˆ:
∂gP
∂ηˆ
= 0. (D.16)
According to (B.25) the decentralized growth rate gD depends positively on ηˆ:
∂gD
∂ηˆ
=
(1/σˆ) f (1, L)− [fk (1, L)− ρ]
[(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]2
=
(C/K)D
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
> 0.
Combining the last two results we obtain
∂
(
gP − gD)
∂ηˆ
= −∂g
D
∂ηˆ
< 0. (D.17)
It is easily verified that the growth rate gap gP − gD can be written in the following two forms:
gP − gD = [f (1, L)− fk (1, L)]− [(1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ] ηˆ
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
=
(1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
×
(
f (1, L)− fk (1, L)
(1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ − ηˆ
)
.
From the second line it follows that gP − gD can be expressed as
gP − gD = Λ× (ηˆcrit − ηˆ) , (D.18)
where
Λ ≡ (1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ
(1/σˆ) + ηˆ
, ηˆcrit ≡ f (1, L)− fk (1, L)
(1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ . (D.19)
Condition (77) implies that (1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ > 0. From (24) it follows that f (1, L) >
fk (1, L). Hence, both Λ > 0 and ηˆ
crit are strictly positive:
Λ > 0, ηˆcrit > 0. (D.20)
From (D.18) and (D.20) it follows that
sgn
(
gP − gD) = sgn (ηˆcrit − ηˆ) . (D.21)
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Using (D.16), (D.17), and (D.19)–(D.21) we obtain the following summary of mathematical
assertions that is identical to the compilation given in Proposition 7 at the end of item i):
∂gP
∂ηˆ
= 0,
∂
(
gP − gD)
∂ηˆ
= −∂g
D
∂ηˆ
< 0,
sgn
(
gP − gD) = sgn (ηˆcrit − ηˆ) , where ηˆcrit ≡ f (1, L)− fk (1, L)
(1− σˆ) f (1, L) + σˆρ > 0.
The validity of the interpretation of these mathematical results that is given at the beginning
of item i) is obvious. 
Proof of ii) From (D.14) it follows that gP depends positively on σˆ:
∂gP
∂σˆ
= [f (1, L)− ρ] = 1
σˆ
gP > 0.
According to (B.24) gD depends positively on σˆ, too:
∂gD
∂σˆ
=
fk (1, L)− ρ+ ηˆf (1, L)
σˆ2 [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]2
=
gD
σˆ2 [(1/σˆ) + ηˆ]
> 0.
The last two results imply that
∂
(
gP − gD)
∂σˆ
=
1
σˆ
(
gP − g
D
1 + σˆηˆ
)
=
1
σˆ
(
gP − gD)+ ηˆ
1 + σˆηˆ
gD ≥ 1
σˆ
(
gP − gD) ,
These results yield the following compilation of mathematical assertions that is given in Propo-
sition 7 at the end of item ii):
∂gP
∂σˆ
> 0,
∂gD
∂σˆ
> 0,
∂
(
gP − gD)
∂σˆ
=
1
σˆ
(
gP − g
D
1 + σˆηˆ
)
≥ 1
σˆ
(
gP − gD) .
The validity of the interpretation of these mathematical results that is given at the beginning
of item ii) is verified at first glance. 
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